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I. DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. ELEMENTS OF BREACH OF DUTy
URING the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court decided
five significant cases further defining and narrowing the common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing. The two most important
of these cases were Lyons v. Millers Casualty Insurance Co.' and Trans-
portation Insurance Co. v. Moriel.2 Both of these cases had an immediate
impact in the trial courts and courts of appeals on litigation involving this
common law duty. The other three cases are National Union Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Dominguez,3 Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc.,4 and Texas Farmers
Insurance Co. v. Soriano.5 Additionally, the court decided to hear three
other cases that will likely be used to further define the duty of good
faith. These cases are Nicolau v. State Farm Lloyds,6 Republic Insurance
Co. v. Stoker,7 and Davis v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co.8
Lyons is the most significant decision penned by the Texas Supreme
Court concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing since Arnold9
and Aranda.10 In Arnold, the court first recognized an insurer's duty to
deal fairly and act in good faith towards its insured in the context of a first
party claim, holding that a breach of this duty "is stated when it is alleged
that there is no reasonable basis for denial of a claim or delay in payment
or a failure on the part of the insurer to determine whether there is any
reasonable basis for the denial or delay."" About a year later in Aranda,
the court refined the standard of care required of the insurer and re-
quired an insured to prove "(1) the absence of a reasonable basis for
denying or delaying payment of the benefits of the policy and (2) that the
carrier knew or should have known that there was not a reasonable basis
for denying the claim or delaying payment of the claim.' 12
1. 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
2. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
3. 873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994).
4. 875 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1994).
5. 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
6. 869 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted).
7. 867 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ granted).
8. 865 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ granted).
9. Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
10. Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
11. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
12. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213.
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The court explained in Aranda that there is an objective and a subjec-
tive element to proving a breach of this duty. The objective element re-
quires a showing that a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances
would have paid the claim.13 The subjective element requires a showing
that the defendant insurer knew there was no reasonable basis to deny or
delay the claim or, based on its duty to investigate, should have known
there was no reasonable basis for denial or delay.14 The court felt the
subjective element was necessary to balance the insurer's right to deny
invalid claims with its duty to investigate and pay valid claims.' 5
As was discussed in last year's Annual Survey' 6 a disagreement arose
among the courts of appeals in 1992 and 1993 about the standard by
which a jury's finding of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing should be reviewed in light of the two Aranda elements. According to
one view, exemplified by State Farm Lloyds, Inc. v. Polasek,17 the court
does not apply the traditional standard of review-that is, looking only at
the evidence supporting the verdict and disregarding the evidence to the
contrary. Instead, the court looks only at the evidence relied upon by the
insurer in denying the claim. If this evidence presents a reasonable basis
for the insurer's conduct, then there is no breach as a matter of law. The
competing view, best discussed in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sim-
mons,18 applies the traditional standard of review and allows the jury to
weigh all the evidence and decide whether the insurer acted in a reason-
able manner when it denied or delayed the claim.
Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court used neither Polasek nor Sim-
mons to resolve this dispute, denying the applications for writ of error in
each case.' 9 Instead, the court used Lyons to try to explain the standard
of review and the proof requirements for establishing a breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. According to the court, a no-evidence
review of a bad faith finding must determine whether "[t]he evidence
presented, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, [per-
mits] the logical inference that the insurer had no reasonable basis to
delay or deny payment of the claim, and that it knew or should have
known it had no reasonable basis for its action." 20
The court further determined that "[t]he evidence must relate to the
tort issue of no reasonable basis, not just to the contract issue of cover-




16. See Philip K. Maxwell and Tim Labadie, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 47 SMU L. REv. 1227, 1296-1304 (1994).
17. 847 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
18. 857 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
19. The supreme court still has not acted on State Farm's motion for rehearing in the
Simmons case.




focus on whether the claim was valid, but on whether the insurer acted
reasonably in denying the claim.22
The court claimed that it was not abolishing the traditional no-evidence
standard of review in bad faith cases but that it was utilizing a "particular-
ized application of our traditional no evidence review."'23 As applied to
this case, the court found that Lyons had presented no evidence that Mill-
ers Casualty had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.24
The evidence showed that Ms. Lyons submitted a claim for damage to
her home, contending the damage was caused by a windstorm. Millers
sent an adjuster and two experts to investigate the loss, all of whom con-
cluded the damage was from settling and cracking, which were excluded
causes. Lyons hired an engineer who concluded that a tree struck the
house during the storm, causing the damages. The jury determined that
one-quarter of the damage was attributable to the windstorm, with the
rest attributable to foundation settlement.
The court noted that the evidence offered by Lyons to prove Millers'
bad faith included an expert's opinion that the wind caused the damage
and the testimony of Lyons and her neighbors that the house was visibly
damaged after the storm. The court viewed this evidence as supporting
contractual liability, but did not consider it in connection with the bad
faith claim. Instead, the court found that Lyons offered no evidence that
the reports of Millers' experts were not objectively prepared or that Mill-
ers' reliance on them was unreasonable, or any other evidence that
showed that Millers acted without a reasonable basis. According to the
court, the insurer will not be liable for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing if it reasonably relied on expert reports indicating that
the loss was not a covered peril, even though liability on the policy is
ultimately established. 25
The court's opinion was not unanimous; Justice Doggett (joined by Jus-
tices Gammage and Hightower), dissented, accusing the majority of en-
gaging in a factual sufficiency review of the evidence which is prohibited
by the Texas Constitution. According to the dissent, under a legal suffi-
ciency review the court must consider only the evidence supporting the
jury's finding, viewed most favorably in support of the finding, and must
disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. 26 Justice Doggett be-
lieved that the majority had discounted Lyons' expert witness, thereby
evaluating the credibility, sufficiency, and weight of Millers' experts in
order to find that their investigation was adequate and factually consti-
tuted a reasonable basis for the denial of the claim.27 As such, the court
22. Id. at 601.
23. Id. at 600.
24. Id. at 601.
25. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601.
26. Id. at 602 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 604. Justice Doggett also claimed that the majority ignored evidence that
supported the jury's verdict: Lyons' and her neighbors' testimony about the damage to the
home immediately after the windstorm; expert testimony that the wind had caused the
1354 [Vol. 48
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engaged in a factual sufficiency review rather than a legal sufficiency
review.
Within a month after deciding Lyons, the court wrote again on this
same subject in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Dominguez.28 In
this case, Dominguez filed a worker's compensation claim for repetitious,
traumatic injury to his back. National Union, the worker's compensation
carrier, denied the claim based on Dominguez's alleged failure to report
the injury as an on-the-job injury and his failure to report the injury
within thirty days. The doctor who had initially seen Dominguez diag-
nosed his back pain as stemming from a degenerative condition rather
than being work-related. However, a second physician diagnosed Do-
minguez's condition as work-related. Soon after National Union and Do-
minguez settled the worker's compensation claim, Dominguez filed this
suit for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jury con-
cluded that National Union breached the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing with conscious indifference to Dominguez's rights. Thus, the trial
court rendered judgment for past and future mental anguish damages and
punitive damages.
The court of appeals reversed the award of punitive damages because
of lack of evidence of National Union's conscious indifference. It also
reversed the award of future mental anguish damages on a no-evidence
point. However, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment for breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing and the past mental anguish
damages. 29
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals and rendered judgment that Dominguez take nothing. According
to the Texas Supreme Court, a claimant alleging breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing has the burden of proving a negative proposi-
tion, the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim of which the
carrier knew or should have known. 30 In conducting a no-evidence re-
view of the jury's finding of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, a court may consider only the evidence supporting the finding
and must disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.31
The court, reiterating its conclusion reached in Lyons, held that a legal
sufficiency review of a bad faith finding requires that the evidence relied
on by the insured as evidence of bad faith "must be such as to permit the
logical inference that the insurer had no reasonable basis to delay or deny
damage to the home; Millers' denial of the claim within a month of its receipt based solely
on a three sentence report; Millers' claims adjuster's refusal to talk to Lyons, hanging up
when she called with inquiries; and its investigators' conscious choice not to interview any
independent eyewitnesses until Lyons filed suit almost two years after making her claim.
28. 873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994).
29. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 793 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1990), rev'd, 873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994).
30. Id., 873 S.W.2d at 376.
31. Id. (citing Garza v. Alvin, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965)).
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payment of the claim, and that it knew, or should have known it had no
reasonable basis for its actions."'32
The court then explained that while a court must give weight only to
evidence supporting the judgment for the insured, rejecting all evidence
to the contrary, it is "only after an appellate court has determined what
potential basis an insurance company may have had for denying a claim
[that] the court [can] conduct a meaningful review of whether the insured
has presented evidence that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for de-
nying or delaying the claim."'33
According to the majority, the only evidence offered by Dominguez
establishing bad faith was a letter sent by a doctor to Dominguez's attor-
ney, stating his opinion that the injury was work-related. The court
viewed this letter only as evidence of coverage, and as such, it could not
serve as evidence of an absence of a reasonable basis for denying the
claim. 34 The court further held that Dominguez presented no evidence
that cast doubt on National Union's reliance on the medical professionals
who diagnosed the condition as a degenerative disease or on Domin-
guez's own statements on insurance forms that his condition was not
work-related. 35 Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no evi-
dence of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Justice Doggett, joined by Justice Gammage, dissented, once again con-
demning the court for failing to make a proper no-evidence review of the
jury findings and improperly engaging in fact-finding. 36 Justice Doggett
accused the majority of misleading the reader concerning the evidence
presented by Dominguez to support the jury's finding of bad faith. Ac-
cording to Justice Doggett, the letter by the doctor mentioned by the ma-
jority was not the only evidence of bad faith.37
Justice Doggett further noted that there was a dispute in the evidence
as to whether Dominguez had promptly notified his employer that his
injury was work-related. Dominguez testified that he had in fact done so.
The majority, however, chose to believe the evidence contradicting Do-
minguez's testimony, even though the jury seemed to resolve the dispute
in favor of Dominguez. Justice Doggett found that there was some evi-
dence of bad faith to justify the jury's finding. Seemingly exasperated,
32. Id. (citing Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600).
33. Id.
34. Dominguez at 376-77.
35. Id., 873 S.W.2d at 377.
36. Id. at 377 (Doggett, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 378 (Doggett, J., dissenting). The other evidence included National Union's
denial of Dominguez's claim on the basis that his injury was not reported within thirty days
or reported as an on-the-job injury; the fact that the decision resulted from the recommen-
dation of an investigator who, apparently, never interviewed Dominguez's managing su-
pervisor; National Union's investigator's complete misrepresentation of Dominguez's post-
injury health care; the investigator's false report indicating that Dominguez did not seek
immediate medical treatment and that the doctor found no physical impairment; and the
incorrect statement in the report that Dominguez had only seen the doctor who concluded
that the injury was job-related once, when in fact, he had been treated on numerous occa-
sions by that doctor.
1356 [Vol. 48
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Justice Doggett wrote "[t]he majority continue[d] its practice of wearing
blinders when evaluating facts not helpful to insurance companies while
violating the constitutional mandate that review by this Court is limited
to legal, not factual, sufficiency." '38
Following closely after Dominguez was Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v.
Soriano.39 This case dealt with the dual issues of an insurer's duty of
good faith and fair dealing and duty to settle under Stowers40 when there
are competing claims for a limited amount of insurance proceeds under
an automobile liability policy. Soriano was the driver of a car that col-
lided head-on with a car driven by Medina. Mr. Medina was severely
injured, Mrs. Medina was killed, and their two children were injured in
the accident. Lopez, a passenger riding with Soriano, was also killed.
Soriano had only minimum insurance coverage through his parents' pol-
icy with Texas Farmers Insurance Group, which provided for limits of
$10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence.
Farmers offered to settle with the Medinas for the $20,000 policy limits,
but the Medinas refused, desiring to determine whether Soriano had any
assets. The Medinas and Lopez's parents then sued Soriano. Farmers set-
tled with the Lopez family for $5000 and offered the remaining $15,000 to
the Medinas. They rejected the offer, demanding the $20,000 policy limit.
The case then proceeded to trial, and the jury found Soriano negligent.
Consequently, the trial court rendered judgment for about $172,000 in
damages.
Soriano then assigned his rights against Farmers to the Medinas, who
thereafter sued for negligence, gross negligence, and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The jury found Farmers negligent and grossly
negligent in their handling of the Medinas' claims. The jury also found
that Farmers breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing to Soriano by
failing to settle with the Medinas. The trial court awarded about $520,000
in actual damages and prejudgment interest, and $5 million in exemplary
damages. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Texas Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Soriano take nothing.41
In addressing the bad faith issue, the court first noted that it has never
recognized a cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing where an insurer failed to settle third-party claims against its in-
sured.42 However, since Farmers did not challenge whether Soriano had
a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the court
determined that it should review the evidence relating to this jury finding.
Farmers asserted only that there was no evidence that it breached a duty
38. 1I at 379.
39. 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
40. G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
41. 844 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993), rev'd, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
42. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d at 317. The court's opinion on the Stowers claim is discussed
supra at note 36 and accompanying text.
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of good faith and fair dealing because it had a reasonable basis for not
settling with the Medinas.
The court again applied the standard of review described in Lyons.
That is, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the insured,
must at least permit the logical inference that the insurer had no reason-
able basis to delay or deny payment of the claim. In addition, the court
held that the evidence must relate to the tort issue of the reasonableness
of denying or delaying payment, and not just the contract issue of
coverage.43
According to the court, Farmers had no duty to pay the Medinas the
full policy limits before the Lopez settlement. Farmers made an offer,
which the Medinas rejected. Only after the Lopez settlement did the
Medinas demand full payment and, at that time, Farmers was under no
obligation to settle for more than the remaining $15,000. As such, Farm-
ers had a reasonable basis for refusing to pay the Medinas more than the
remaining $15,000, and, therefore, it did not breach a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.44
The court of appeals and the trial courts were not long in responding to
Lyons and Dominguez. Some courts, however, rather than relying on Ly-
ons, resorted to Polasek, concluding that Lyons adopted the approach
taken by Polasek.45 This is a serious error because Polasek is much more
extreme than Lyons. Even though it is not clearly articulated in Lyons,
the Texas Supreme Court seems to require the insured to prove that the
evidence relied on by the insurance company to deny or delay the claim
did not provide a reasonable basis for such denial or delay. Thus, the
court found significant the fact that the insureds in Lyons and Dominguez
failed to show that the insurers' reliance on their experts' opinions was
unreasonable. 46 The Polasek approach, however, would seem to rule out
a breach of the duty even when it is shown that an insurer's reliance on an
expert's opinion was unreasonable.
Early in its opinion, the Polasek court stated that "the insured must
prove that there were no facts before the insurer which, if believed,
would justify denial of the claim."'47 Then the court stated, "In a bad-
faith action, the issue is whether there was evidence in existence before
[the insurer]; the issue is not whether [the insurer] correctly evaluated the
evidence before it. ''48 Along these same lines, the court also stated, "The
issue in the bad faith case is not whether the factfinder believes the evi-
dence that [the insurer] believed when it denied the claim; the issue is
whether such evidence existed. ' 49 There is no requirement that the in-
surer's belief in the information it uses to deny a claim be reasonable.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 318.
45. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601; Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d at 377.
47. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 284.
48. Id at 285.
49. Id. at 286.
1358 [Vol. 48
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The Polasek court did pay homage to the requirement of Arnold and
Aranda that the basis for the denial be reasonable, but effectively elimi-
nated the objective test of bad faith announced in Aranda. The court held
that in a case where the insurer's denial of a claim is based upon the
contention that the insureds burned their own house, "the issue in the
bad faith suit is not whether the [insureds] set the fire, or whether a rea-
sonable insurer would have decided that they did nor did not set it.''5°
Moreover, the court held that "[a] bad faith cause of action is not satis-
fied by proof ... that [the insurer] acted unreasonably in denying [the]
claim."'51 The focus for this court was whether the insurer discovered in-
formation which, if believed, served as a reasonable basis for denial of the
claim. Thus, the court held that it is not up to the "trier of fact to second-
guess the insurer about reasonableness" or "to decide whether the in-
surer acted reasonably,"52 a far more narrow view of the duty of good
faith than that taken by the supreme court in Lyons.
Even though the Polasek test is much more strict than Lyons, it is un-
questionably easier to apply, which may be the reason some courts of
appeals are looking to Polasek rather than Lyons for guidance. For ex-
ample, in Rogers v. CIGNA Insurance Co. of Texas,53 the court relied
heavily upon Polasek to affirm a directed verdict in favor of the insurer
on the issue of good faith and fair dealing.
While driving a car provided by his employer, Rogers collided with a
train and suffered injuries. After the accident, CIGNA, his employer's
workers' compensation insurer, began paying indemnity and medical ben-
efits for total incapacity. Rogers returned to work three months after the
accident, and CIGNA stopped paying the benefits after about six months.
Rogers then filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board, asking that
he be given indemnity benefits for total and permanent incapacity. After
the Industrial Accident Board awarded Rogers partial incapacity,
CIGNA filed suit to set aside the award. The jury found total and perma-
nent incapacity. The parties settled while the appeal was pending. Rogers
then filed this suit claiming that CIGNA breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing when it denied his claim. After Rogers rested during the
trial of this matter, the court granted CIGNA's motion for a directed ver-
dict. In affirming, the court of appeals first noted that the traditional
standard for reviewing directed verdicts would require that it disregard
evidence favoring CIGNA and consider only the evidence favorable to
Rogers. The court, however, held that this traditional standard of review
was altered by Polasek and, thus, could not be used in a bad faith case.5 4
50. Id.
51. Id. at 283.
52. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 287. As one might expect, one of the Beaumont court's
main criticisms of Polasek was that it took away from the jury the determination of
whether the insurer's conduct was reasonable and allowed the insurer to be the arbiter of
its own conduct. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d at 136.
53. 881 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
54. Id. at 183.
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Instead, the court must determine whether there was any evidence before
CIGNA that gave it a reasonable basis to deny Rogers' claim. If any such
evidence is found by the court, the directed verdict must be affirmed.
The court relied upon the statement in Polasek that the issue in such a
bad faith case is "whether there was evidence in existence before [the
insurer]; ... not whether [the insurer] correctly evaluated the evidence
before it."'5 5 Thus, the court felt that it could not disregard the evidence
supporting the insurer's denial, but rather, the court held that it must
disregard the evidence favoring the insured because, again quoting Pola-
sek, "Courts and juries do not weigh the conflicting evidence that was
before the insurer; they decide whether evidence existed to justify denial
of the claim." 56
Consequently, the court of appeals considered only the evidence sup-
porting CIGNA's decision to deny Rogers' claim, concluding that there
was a reasonable basis for doing so as a matter of law. The court noted
that before Rogers would be entitled to payments for total incapacity, he
would have to be unable to secure and hold the type of employment at
which he was making a living before his injury.57 CIGNA, however, had
reports from four doctors, all of whom concluded that Rogers could re-
turn to the same work he had been doing before the accident. The court
held that, based on the reports, CIGNA had a reasonable basis to con-
clude that Rogers was not totally incapacitated.5 8
The court also found that CIGNA had a reasonable basis not to make
payments for partial incapacity. To be entitled to payments for partial
incapacity, an employee must suffer a reduction in earning capacity. Rog-
ers, however, returned to work in the same job he held before the acci-
dent making the same amount of money. In fact, his earnings had
increased annually since the accident. The court held that this was some
evidence that CIGNA had a reasonable basis to dispute Rogers' claim for
payments for partial incapacity.59
Rogers argued that the directed verdict was improper because one of
his witnesses testified that CIGNA had no reasonable basis for the han-
dling of his claim. This witness testified that it was unreasonable for
CIGNA to appeal the Board's award. The court determined that this tes-
timony did not preclude the directed verdict because there was other un-
disputed evidence that CIGNA did have a reasonable basis.
60
Another case relying more on Polasek than Lyons is Cortez v. Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Co.61 After receiving workers' compensation ben-
efits for almost two years, Cortez saw Dr. Capen, an independent medical
55. Id. (quoting Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 281).
56. Id. (quoting Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 281).
57. Id. at 184 (citing Trnity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rose, 217 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
58. Rogers, 881 S.W.2d at 184.
59. Id. at 185.
60. Id.
61. 885 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1994, writ denied).
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evaluation doctor, who concluded that Cortez could return to work. Re-
lying on this medical evaluation, Liberty Mutual requested a prehearing
conference to determine if there was a reasonable medical basis for sus-
pending Cortez's weekly benefits. The benefits were suspended after the
conference, and Cortez filed suit for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing and continuation of workers' compensation benefits. Cortez
settled his workers' compensation suit in October 1992.
Liberty Mutual then filed a motion for summary judgment in the bad
faith case, arguing that: (1) a reasonable basis for suspension of benefits
was shown as a matter of law; (2) collateral estoppel barred the bad faith
action; and (3) judicial admission barred the bad faith action. The trial
court granted summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed.
After quoting the Aranda elements of bad faith, the court noted that
carriers can deny invalid or questionable claims without being subject to
liability for an erroneous denial. In considering the propriety of a sum-
mary judgment on a bad faith claim, the court held that if there was con-
flicting evidence as to whether there was reasonable basis for the carrier's
action, a jury issue existed and summary judgment should not be granted.
If, however, uncontroverted evidence of a reasonable basis is present, the
bad faith claim is defeated. 62
Relying on T.E.LA. v. Puckett,63 Cortez argued that Liberty Mutual
had no reasonable basis for suspending benefits because it violated Indus-
trial Accident Board Rules by acting on an independent medical evalua-
tion rather than a release by his treating physician. The court, however,
distinguished Puckett because in that case the carrier unilaterally discon-
tinued benefits without a medical release from any source.64
Under the circumstances of this case, the court held that Dr. Capen's
opinion stating Cortez could return to work, although not a release from
Cortez's treating physician, constituted a reasonable basis for suspending
the benefits as a matter of law.65 According to the court, Dr. Capen's
opinion was not controverted by the treating physician. Furthermore,
Liberty Mutual did not immediately stop making payments but waited
until a prehearing conference was held.
Several other courts after Lyons granted summary judgment in favor of
the insurer on the issue of good faith and fair dealing, finding that as a
matter of law the insurer had a reasonable basis for denying the claim.
These cases include Ramirez v. Transcontinental Insurance Co.,66 Packer
v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of Rhode Island,67 Emmert v. Progressive
County Mutual Insurance Co.,68 Emscor Manufacturing, Inc. v. Alliance
62. Id. at 469.
63. 822 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
64. Cortez, 885 S.W.2d at 470 n.1.
65. Id. at 470-71.
66. 881 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
67. 881 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
68. 882 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, writ denied).
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Insurance Group,69 and Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc. v. Royal Indemnity
Co. 70
In Packer, the court affirmed the summary judgment that the insurer
had established a reasonable basis for denying the workers' compensation
claim based on the evidence that three out of four doctors who treated
Packer's back injury recommended against surgery.71 Moreover, there
was no evidence that Travelers' reliance on the opinions of these three
doctors was unreasonable or that their opinions were not objective. 72 Ac-
cording to the Packer court, when a bona fide controversy exists as to
coverage, an insurer should be free to deny the claim and have the ques-
tion of coverage litigated without being subjected to tort liability. 73
The Ramirez court also focused on the notion of a bona fide contro-
versy to affirm a summary judgment in favor of a workers' compensation
carrier.74 Ramirez claimed that his existing temporomandibular joint
syndrome (TMJ) was aggravated by an on-the-job accident and filed for
workers' compensation benefits. Transcontinental refused to pay bene-
fits. The Texas Workers' Compensation Commission found that Ramirez
suffered an injury in the course and scope of his employment and
awarded him $15,590. Transcontinental appealed the award to the district
court and eventually settled this claim with Ramirez. Soon thereafter,
Ramirez filed suit against Transcontinental for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Transcontinental responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment, claiming that it had a reasonable basis to deny Rami-
rez's claim. The trial court granted this motion. The court of appeals af-
firmed. In reviewing the summary judgment, the court set aside the
traditional standard of review, opting for the "particularized application
of [the] traditional no evidence review" set forth in Dominguez and Ly-
ons.75 Ramirez, relying on Guajardo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,76
argued that the summary judgment was improper because Transcontinen-
tal's reliance on Dr. Rejaie's opinions was unreasonable in light of re-
ports from his dentist, who presented a contrary opinion. The court,
while agreeing that situations may arise where a contrary medical opinion
will cast doubt on the reliability of the insurer's expert's opinion, dis-
agreed with Ramirez's position that summary judgment is improper any
time conflicting medical opinions exist. The court held that Ramirez did
not present evidence to show that Transcontinental's reliance on its ex-
pert was unreasonable.77
69. 879 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
70. 879 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
71. Packer, 881 S.W.2d at 175-76.
72. Id. at 176.
73. Id.
74. Ramirez, 881 S.W.2d at 822.
75. Id.
76. 831 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
77. Ramirez, 881 S.W.2d at 826.
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Ramirez claimed that evidence of Transcontinental's unreasonable reli-
ance on Dr. Rejaie's opinions included an entry in the claim file that he
referred Ramirez to a Dr. Morgan because he, Dr. Rejaie, "was not an
expert." The court dismissed this statement because while Dr. Rejaie ad-
mitted that he did not normally treat TMJ, he never said he was not an
expert in diagnosing TMJ. The court also found important the fact that
Ramirez, not Transcontinental, chose Dr. Rejaie and that Dr. Phillips did
not dispute or criticize Dr. Rejaie's conclusions or attack his credentials
or impartiality.78
Ramirez next argued that Transcontinental did not have a reasonable
basis for denying the claim because its denial was based solely on evi-
dence that Ramirez had a preexisting condition and preexisting condi-
tions are compensable if an on-the-job injury aggravates that condition.
Ramirez relied on Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crowe.79 The
court distinguished Crowe because the carrier in that case denied the
claim based on a preexisting condition without conducting any investiga-
tion into whether the condition was aggravated by an on-the-job injury.80
According to the court, Transcontinental did conduct an investigation by
obtaining statements from five of Ramirez's co-workers, which conflicted
with Dr. Phillips conclusions. 81
Relying on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons82 and Common-
wealth Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Thomas,83 Ramirez argued that the Trans-
continental investigation was outcome-oriented. The court, however,
distinguished those cases as ones where a carrier ignored investigative
leads. According to the court, there was no evidence that Transcontinen-
tal ignored any information in its investigation.84
Ramirez was not a unanimous decision. Justice Ellis, in his dissent,
urged that Dr. Phillips' medical opinion was sufficient to raise a fact issue
on reasonable basis and that the issue should have been submitted to a
jury. According to Justice Ellis, a dispute about whether there is a rea-
sonable basis to support the denial of a claim is a fact issue for the jury.85
If the court were to truly indulge every reasonable inference and resolve
any doubts in favor of Ramirez, wrote Justice Ellis, there would be suffi-
cient evidence to raise a fact issue on reasonable basis. Specifically, Jus-
tice Ellis pointed to the evidence of Dr. Phillips' opinion that Ramirez's
TMJ was aggravated by an on-the-job injury. Moreover, Transcontinental
received this opinion shortly after September 15, 1989, the date of Dr.
Phillips' report. However, an October 27, 1989 entry to the claim file
78. Id.
79. 857 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ dism'd, 863 S.W.2d 462
(Tex. 1993).
80. Ramirez, 881 S.W.2d at 826-27.
81. Id. at 827.
82. 857 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
83. 825 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), writ dism'd, 843 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1993).
84. Ramirez, 881 S.W.2d at 827-28.
85. Id at 829.
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noted that Transcontinental told Ramirez's attorney that it did not have
medical information to support Ramirez's non-work status.
At that time Transcontinental had only a verbal report from Dr. Rejaie
that Ramirez's condition was probably not work-related. However, there
was a notation in the file that the doctor was not an expert, and the file
was referred to Dr. Morgan. Justice Ellis questioned the majority's dis-
missal of Dr. Rejaie's lack of expertise by drawing a distinction between
diagnosing and treating. Justice Ellis felt that the ability to diagnose TMJ
did not conclusively establish that Transcontinental's reliance on Dr.
Rejaie's opinion was a reasonable basis. Additionally, Justice Ellis
pointed out that Dr. Phillips, who worked with Dr. Morgan and who was
this physician to whom Ramirez was referred, had concluded that the
TMJ was work-related.8 6
Emmert, Emscor, and Pioneer Chlor are similar in that in each case the
court found that the insurer, in the face of an ambiguous policy provision,
acted in good faith by construing the provision in such a way to deny
coverage. Although the court in Emmert did not specifically address the
issue, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Emscor and Pioneer Chlor con-
cluded that since a provision is ambiguous only if there are two or more
reasonable interpretations, the insurer's interpretation must be a reason-
able basis for denying the claim.87 The fallacy of equating a reasonable
interpretation with a reasonable basis for denying a claim is that the law,
which insurers are presumed to know, demands an insurer to construe an
ambiguous provision in favor of the insured and in favor of coverage.
88
If, as a matter of contract law, the insurer cannot construe an ambiguous
provision in its favor, reliance on its own interpretation cannot, as a mat-
ter of law, serve as a reasonable basis for a denial.
Likewise, exclusionary clauses must be strictly construed in favor of the
insured and against the insurer. In Emmert, the court, while recognizing
that the exclusions in Emmert's policy (along with the exception to the
exclusions) were at best unclear and ambiguous, held that, while there
was coverage, Progressive did not breach its duty of good faith and fair
dealing by construing the exclusion against Emmert.89 This result simply
is not consistent with basic contract law.
Some courts, while following the precedent of Lyons, clearly have re-
jected the extreme approach devised by Justice Peeples in Polasek, in-
cluding other panels of the San Antonio court on which Justice Peeples
sits. One such case is Southern Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Alfaro.90
86. Id. at 830.
87. Emscor, 879 S.W.2d at 910; Pioneer Chlor, 879 S.W.2d at 939-40.
88. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
1991).
89. 882 S.W.2d at 34, 36.
90. 875 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ). The court originally is-
sued its opinion on February 26, 1993, which is mentioned in last year's Annual Survey.
See Maxwell, supra note 16, at 1304. While the case was on rehearing, the Texas Supreme
Court decided Lyons and Dominguez. Upon rehearing, the court incorporated the Lyons
standard of review and still found sufficient evidence to support the finding of bad faith.
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In this case, Tony Alfaro was shot and killed by Castillo. Tony was the
named insured in a $10,000 term life insurance policy issued by Southern
Life & Health Insurance Company (SL&H). The policy had a $10,000
accidental indemnity rider. Antonio Alfaro, Tony's uncle and primary
beneficiary, was paid the $10,000 face amount, but was denied the acci-
dental double indemnity claim because, according to SL&H, Tony's death
resulted, directly or indirectly, from the commission or attempted com-
mission of an assault or felony.
Antonio sued SL&H claiming violations of the Texas Insurance Code.
Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court rendered judgment for Alfaro
for the double indemnity accidental death benefit, additional damages,
prejudgment interest and attorney's fees.
SL&H argued that there was no evidence that it did not attempt a good
faith settlement after liability had become reasonably clear, because a
bona fide controversy is sufficient reason for an insurer not to pay a
claim. In deciding whether SL&H acted in bad faith, the court noted that
the appropriate no evidence standard of review under Lyons requires the
court to focus:
on the relationship of the evidence arguably supporting the bad faith
finding to the elements of bad faith. The evidence presented, viewed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, must be such as to
permit the logical inference that the insurer had no reasonable basis
to delay or deny payment of the claim, and that it knew or should
have known it had no reasonable basis for its actions.91
Upon reviewing the evidence, the court found that both elements of
bad faith were proven by Alfaro. There was some evidence that Tony
was not attempting to commit an assault or any other felony at the time
Castillo shot him. Furthermore, there was evidence that SL&H did not
conduct a thorough investigation of the claim, as it failed to interview two
women who were present at the murder scene and to review Castillo's
written confession until three months after the claim was denied. Addi-
tionally, the jury was presented with evidence that SL&H postponed its
decision regarding the claim until the end of Castillo's trial. According to
the court, SL&H should have known there was no reasonable basis for
denial or delay. Thus, the court held that the jury's finding was not so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence as to be clearly wrong
and unjust.9"
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, has also rejected
Justice Peeples' opinion in Polasek. In Employers National Insurance Co.
v. Dalros93 the court affirmed a judgment based on the insurer's breach of
91. Id. at 742 (quoting Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. 1993)).
92. Id. at 744-46.
93. No. 04-92-00078-CV, 1994 WL 81435 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Mar. 14, 1994,
n.w.h.) (en banc) (Chief Justice Chapa wrote the majority opinion, and Justices Peeples
and Rickhofff wrote dissenting opinions). After this case was decided, the insurer was
placed in receivership, and an injunction was issued preventing any action against the in-
surer. Thus, the case has been abated pending the outcome of the receivership.
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the duty of good faith and fair dealing even in light of Lyons. In this case,
Dalros submitted a claim to Employers for damage to his pool. Several
days later, without any investigation, Employers informed Dalros over
the phone that the claim had been denied due to flooding. A couple of
weeks later, the pool cracked and Dalros again called Employers. Later,
an adjuster was sent out by Employers to inspect the pool. The adjuster
suggested that the claim be denied because the loss was caused by crack-
ing, an exclusion under the policy.
Approximately one year later, an attorney hired by Dalros sent a de-
mand letter to Employers. Within two months Employers sent Dalros a
$10,000 check, representing the policy limits. Dalros later filed suit, alleg-
ing that Employers breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
jury found against Employers and awarded $12,500 in damages for
mental anguish and $250,000 in exemplary damages. The court of ap-
peals, relying on Polasek, originally reversed and rendered judgment that
Dalros take nothing, holding that Dalros did not prove that there was no
evidence, supporting Employers' initial denial leading to the delay in or-
der to establish a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. On a
motion for rehearing en banc, the court affirmed the judgment for actual
damages caused by the insurer's bad faith but reversed the judgment as to
exemplary damages.
The court first considered whether there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the jury's finding that Employers breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing. In making this legal sufficiency review, the court relied upon
the standard set forth in Lyons.94 The Texas Supreme Court in Lyons
stated that the evidence must relate to the issue of no reasonable basis,
not just to the contract issue of coverage. 95 The San Antonio court inter-
preted this to mean that the evidence could not relate just to the issue of
coverage.96 That is not to say, however, that any evidence relating to
coverage is automatically unrelated to the bad faith claim.
Tuming to the evidence, the court noted that Employers, without con-
ducting an investigation, initially denied the claim based on an exclusion
for flooding. As Employers later conceded, the flooding exclusion had no
application to Dalros' claim. Thus, the court concluded that Employers
had no reasonable basis for denying the claim on this basis. Employers
later denied the claim based on an exclusion for losses caused by "crack-
ing." The court held, however, that the cracking did not occur until four-
teen to eighteen days after the claim was made. Moreover, there was
evidence that, had the pool been examined when the claim was first
made, no cracking would have been found. Additionally, there was evi-
dence that, if the claim had been paid when it was first submitted, the
cracking could have been minimized or prevented by repair work. There-
fore, the court held that it was unreasonable to deny the claim based on
94. Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
95. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 606.
96. Dalros, 1994 WL 81435 at *3-4.
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an exclusion that only became applicable due to the insurer's delay in
investigating the claim.97 Employers also complained that the trial court
refused to instruct the jury on the existence of a "bona fide controversy."
The court held this was not necessary in light of the reaffirmation in Ly-
ons of the no evidence test in bad faith cases.
Justice Rickhoff dissented, claiming that Dalros offered no evidence
that Employers did not have a reasonable basis for denying the claim.98
According to Justice Rickhoff, the loss to Dalros' pool was caused by
cracking, which was specifically excluded from coverage. Because there
was no contractual liability, Justice Rickhoff argued there should be no
bad faith liability. Justice Rickhoff also called for the elimination of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the first party insurance context. He
claimed that this common law action is unnecessary because insureds
have at their disposal causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, negli-
gence, and violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code. Moreover, in-
surance companies are subject to intense state regulation and can be
severely reprimanded by the Insurance Board if too many complaints are
made. Justice Rickhoff also suggested that, contrary to what the Texas
Supreme Court thought in Arnold, there is no unequal bargaining power
in favor of the insurer. According to Justice Rickhoff, the insured holds
the advantage because insurance policies are to be construed in favor of
the insured, not the insurer.99
Another case after Lyons to affirm a judgment based on breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is Universe Life Insurance Co. v.
Giles.' °° Universe Life denied Giles' health insurance claims for her hos-
pitalization and subsequent bypass operation several months later. The
insurer contended that the claims had arisen as the result of preexisting
conditions. Universe Life's conclusion was based upon a prescription
Giles had been given to decrease her cholesterol levels. Universe Life
equated the prescription to treatment for heart disease. Additionally, the
medical records of Dr. Sanford, one of Giles' physicians, reflected that
she had experienced chest pain and hypertension for two to three years.
Dr. Sanford corrected his statement and informed Universe Life that the
chest pain had only been experienced for two to three weeks with no
hypertension. Universe Life, however, continued to deny the claim. The
jury found that Universe Life breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing to Giles. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment based on
this finding, in light of the evidence that Universe Life had continued to
deny Giles' claims based on Dr. Sanford's records even after he corrected
his records. 101 Universe Life even sued Dr. Sanford, claiming that he
caused the denial of the claim. That suit was dismissed. Additionally, for a
97. Dalros, 1994 WL 81435, at *4.
98. Id. at *6 (Rickhoff, J., dissenting).
99. I& at *6-7.
100. 881 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested).
101. Giles, 881 S.W.2d at 49.
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substantial length of time Universe Life had refused to tell Giles the rea-
sons for denying her claim.
Before Lyons was decided, the El Paso Court of Appeals, in Republic
Insurance Co. v. Stoker,10 2 concluded that an insurer can be liable for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing even in the absence of
contractual liability. In this case, Stoker came suddenly upon a traffic jam
caused by a delivery truck that had lost some of its furniture. Stoker,
unable to stop, rear-ended Templeton. Stoker did not hit any of the fur-
niture or the delivery truck. Stoker submitted a claim to Republic under
her uninsured motorist coverage. Without doing much investigation, Re-
public denied the claim after concluding that Stoker was more than fifty
percent at fault in causing the accident.
The trial court granted Republic a summary judgment on the contract
finding no coverage because there was no physical contact between
Stoker and the pickup truck that dropped furniture onto the highway.
The "no physical contact" reason was not asserted by Republic until liti-
gation ensued. However, judgment was rendered in favor of Stoker
based on the jury's finding that Republic had breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing, had engaged in unfair or deceptive acts, and had
committed unconscionable conduct. The court of appeals affirmed. Re-
public argued that Stoker, because there was no coverage under the pol-
icy, could not recover for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. According to Republic, its refusal to pay the claim, no matter
how wrong the reason, could not cause any harm to Stoker because there
was no contractual liability. The court disagreed.
Relying on Viles v. Security National Insurance Co.,103 the court con-
cluded that an insurer can breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing
even in the absence of contractual liability.' °4 In Viles, the court held that
the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a tort, separate and
distinct from a cause of action for breach of contract.' 05 Accordingly, the
Texas Supreme Court permitted Viles to recover for the insurer's bad
faith even though he had not submitted a proof of loss, which was a con-
tractual condition precedent. Moreover, the supreme court held that the
special relationship which gives rise to the duty of good faith and fair
dealing also imposes on the insurer "a duty to investigate claims thor-
oughly and in good faith, and to deny those claims only after an investiga-
tion reveals there is a reasonable basis to do so.'106
Republic denied Stoker's claim without reviewing the police report,
without viewing the accident scene or the photographs of it, and without
interviewing witnesses. Moreover, prior to suit being filed, Republic only
asserted as the basis of denying the claim that Stoker was more than fifty
102. 867 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1993, writ granted).
103. 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990).
104. Stoker, 867 S.W.2d at 78.
105. Viles, 788 S.W.2d at 567.
106. Id. at 568.
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percent at fault and not that there had been a lack of physical contact.
Thus, according to the court, Stoker could assert a cause of action for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.' 0 7
The court further held that an insured is entitled to rely upon the in-
surer's stated grounds for denying a claim so she can make reasoned deci-
sions about pursuing claims in court. To hold otherwise would allow the
insurer to escape liability under any theory that allows it to avoid pay-
ment, no matter how late the theory is advanced and no matter how weak
the earlier theory. 08
Justice Koehler dissented, arguing that there can be no liability for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing when the insurer has no
contractual duty to pay the claim.1' 9 According to the dissent, a breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is established by showing the
absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim. Thus, if there exists a
reasonable basis for denying the claim, it should not matter whether the
insurer conducted a thorough investigation or whether the reason given
was valid. Justice Koehler felt that Republic had a reasonable basis for
denying the claim because there was no physical contact with the unin-
sured motorist. 1 0
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ on May 11, 1994 on five points
of error, one of which was that the insurer could not be liable in tort for
improperly investigating a claim if there was a valid reason to deny the
claim (even though not discovered by insurer until much later)."' A
foreshadowing of the court's resolution of this case in favor of the insurer
may be seen in the supreme court's statement in Transportation Insurance
Co. v. Moriel 12 that "[t]he threshold of bad faith is reached when a
breach of contract is accompanied by an independent tort."
113
Another case decided before Lyons that the court decided to hear is
Nicolau v. State Farm Lloyds." 4 One of the main issues in this case asked
when an insurer's reliance on its expert's opinions could be considered
unreasonable so as to subject the insurer to liability for bad faith. The
Nicolaus sued State Farm after it denied their claim made under a home-
owners policy for repairs to correct damage caused by movement of their
homes' foundation. State Farm denied the claim, contending that the
damage was caused by an inherent vice or settling, both of which were
excluded under the policy. The jury found that State Farm breached its
contract, breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and engaged in
an unconscionable action or course of action as prohibited by the DTPA.
The jury awarded $102,200 as policy benefits for the necessary repairs,
107. Stoker, 867 S.W.2d at 79.
108. Id at 80.
109. Id at 80-81 (Koehler, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 81.
111. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 774 (May 111, 1994).
112. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
113. Id at 17.
114. 869 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted).
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$50,000 for mental anguish, and $300,000 as exemplary damages for State
Farm's malicious breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
trial court rendered a judgment n.o.v. on the extra-contractual claims and
rendered judgment only on the breach of contract claim. The court of
appeals affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.
The court held that an insurer's reliance on an expert to provide techni-
cal assistance in determining whether the particular loss is covered under
the policy must be reasonable. 115 In order to prove that the insurer acted
in bad faith because its reliance upon the expert was unreasonable, the
insured can attack the expert's opinion in two ways. First, according to
the court, the insured can present contrary expert opinion. Whether this
evidence destroys the insurer's reasonable basis is a fact question for the
jury.116 Second, held the court, the insured can attack the credibility of
the expert and show that the insurer's expert's opinion was questionable
and the insurer knew or should have known the opinion was
questionable.117
The dispute between the Nicolaus and State Farm focused on the cause
of the damage to their home. State Farm contended that foundation
movement was the cause, which was excluded by the policy from cover-
age. The Nicolaus, while admitting that there was foundation movement,
asserted that a leaking pipe caused this problem, which was a covered
event. In order to determine that nature of the loss, State Farm hired
Haag Engineering to inspect the house. Haag Engineering concluded
that the leak did not contribute to the foundation movement. However,
the Nicolaus presented evidence that State Farm knew that Haag Engi-
neering rarely, if ever, determined that a localized leak beneath the house
caused foundation movement. They also presented evidence that despite
its awareness of a plumbing leak beneath the house, Haag concluded that
there was no relationship between the plumbing leak and the foundation
damage without even isolating the leak, determining its severity, or tak-
ing soil samples.
Moreover, Haag did not reconsider its opinion, even after soil borings
were performed indicating that the moisture content of the clay under the
Nicolau home was high."18 Based on this evidence, the court concluded
that there was more than enough evidence for a jury to determine that a
reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would not have denied
the Nicolaus' claim.1 9 Additionally, the jury could have inferred that
State Farm's reliance on its experts was not reasonable.
State Farm complained to the Texas Supreme Court about many rul-
ings made by the court of appeals. The supreme court granted State
Farm's application for writ of error on several points, two of which as-
115. Id. at 551.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 551.
119. Nicolau, 879 S.W.2d at 551.
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serted that the court of appeals erred by not applying the no evidence
review as stated in Lyons.120 However, if Lyons stands for the proposi-
tion that an insured must present evidence that the information used by
the insurer did not form a reasonable basis for denying the claim, it seems
that the Nicolaus met this burden by showing that State Farm knew that
the results of its engineer's inspection would support noncoverage since
he did not believe that a plumbing leak such as experienced by the Nico-
laus could ever be the cause of foundation movement.
B. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY
1. Punitive Damages
Whereas Lyons was the most significant decision concerning the evi-
dence necessary to establish a breach of the insurer's duty of good faith,
the most significant concerning the recovery of exemplary damages was
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel.'2' While at work, Juan Moriel
suffered injuries initially requiring twelve days of hospitalization. Trans-
portation, the workers' compensation carrier, paid for the hospitalization
costs. After being released from the hospital, Moriel began experiencing
a loss of movement in one leg and impotence. Moriel was referred to the
Baylor College of Medicine Sleep Disorders and Research Center in
Houston after his doctors could not find a physical cause for the impo-
tence. Transportation eventually indicated that it would cover the tests at
Baylor, but not Moriel's expenses in traveling to Houston from El Paso,
where Moriel lived. Moriel agreed to these terms and underwent tests at
Baylor. The tests indicated that Moriel's impotence was caused in part by
a physical problem.
Although Transportation had authorized the testing at Baylor in ad-
vance, it took Transportation more than two years to pay for the tests.
Transportation claimed that it delayed payment because it did not
promptly receive the Baylor medical report, although Moriel testified
that he personally delivered it to the claim adjuster shortly after the tests
were completed. Transportation's explanation of why it continued to de-
lay payment, even after the date it conceded the report was received, was
that it did not think the impotence was related to Moriel's on-the-job
injury. Several other medical bills were submitted to Transportation for
payment, all of which Transportation delayed payment for more than one
year.
Moriel filed a workers' compensation claim against Transportation and
obtained an award from the Industrial Accident Board in excess of
$30,000. After Transportation appealed that award to the district court,
Moriel added a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
based on Transportation's unreasonable delay in paying the claims. The
120. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 965 (June 15, 1994). The two other points of error granted
related to the findings of unconscionable conduct and punitive damages.
121. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
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workers' compensation claim was settled and the bad faith claim was
tried to a jury, which found that Transportation acted with heedless and
reckless disregard of Moriel's rights when it delayed payment of the
claims without a reasonable basis for doing so. The jury awarded
$101,000 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive damages. The trial
court entered judgment based on the verdict and the court of appeals
affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new
trial.
Because Transportation did not challenge the jury's finding of bad
faith, the only issue before the court was the propriety of the punitive
damages. The end result was the creation of a new standard for proving
gross negligence as a prerequisite for recovering punitive damages for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court's first step
was to reevaluate the definition of gross negligence because, at least, this
degree of conduct must be proven to recover punitive damages. The
court first looked to the definition of gross negligence found in Burk Roy-
alty Co. v. Walls:'22 "Gross negligence ... should be that entire want of
care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of
was the result of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the
person or persons to be affected by it. ' '123
The court noted that before Burk Royalty the courts focused on the
component of "entire want of care" and reasoned that if some care were
shown there could not be any gross negligence. 124 The Burk Royalty
court changed this emphasis by admonishing courts to look for evidence
of the defendant's mental state rather than the exercise of care.
The court criticized Burk Royalty for eroding the distinction between
negligence and gross negligence by permitting an inference of the defend-
ant's mental state from surrounding circumstances.' 25 The court com-
plained that after Burk Royalty a jury could infer gross negligence from
evidence of some carelessness, thereby failing to consider the definition
of "gross negligence" as a whole. Thus, the court, rather than utilizing
the Burk Royalty definition, looked to the statutory definition of "gross
negligence," which is: "such an entire want of care as to establish that the
act or omission was the result of actual conscious indifference to the
rights, safety, or welfare of the person affected.'
' 26
From this definition the court concluded that the are two components
of gross negligence: 1) the defendant's act or omission, and 2) the de-
fendant's mental state.' 27 The first component is objective in nature.
That is, "[o]bjectively, the defendant's conduct must involve an 'extreme
122. 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981).
123. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 19 (citing Mission Pac. Ry. v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165, 171, 10
S.W. 408, 411 (1988)).
124. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 20.
125. Id. at 21.
126. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001 (5) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
127. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 21-22.
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degree of risk'.....,128 The requirement that there be an extreme degree
of risk "is not satisfied by a remote possibility of injury or even a high
probability of minor harm, but rather 'the likelihood of serious injury' to
the plaintiff."' 129
Additionally, the court held that whether an extreme risk is created by
a defendant's conduct requires "an examination of the events and circum-
stances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events oc-
curred, without viewing the matter in hindsight.' 130 The second
component is described by the court as subjective in nature. That is, "the
defendant must have actual awareness of the extreme risk created by his
or her conduct.' 131 While reaffirming that this subjective mental state
can be proven by circumstantial evidence, the court rejected, as mislead-
ing, the holding in Williams v. Steves Industries, Inc.132 that gross negli-
gence could be proven if, under the surrounding circumstances, a
reasonable person would have realized that his conduct created an ex-
treme degree of risk to the safety of others. 133 Thus, the court held that
to prove gross negligence one must show that the act was likely to result
in serious harm and that the defendant (rather than a reasonable person)
was consciously indifferent to the risk of harm.134
Applying these same principles to the bad faith context, the court
found an insurer will be liable for punitive damages for its bad faith only
when its conduct creates a risk of serious harm to the insured and the
insurer is aware that the insured would probably suffer serious injury be-
cause of the conduct. 135 The harm or injury that the insured must suffer,
according to the court, must be "independent and qualitatively different"
from the damages resulting from a breach of contract and from the in-
surer's bad faith.136 Mental anguish, mere inconvenience, annoyance or
delay do not satisfy this requirement. 137 Instead, the court held that "an
insurance carrier's refusal to pay a claim cannot justify punishment unless
the insurer was actually aware that its action would probably result in
extraordinary harm not ordinarily associated with breach of contract or
bad faith denial of a claim-such as death, grievous physical injury, or
financial ruin."'1 38
Just as Lyons greatly narrowed the conduct of insurers which will
amount to a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Moriel all
but eliminated the possibility that an insurer will be liable for punitive
128. Id. at 22 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.
1993)).
129. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 868 S.W.2d at 327).
130. Id. at 23.
131. Id. at 22 (citing Wal.Mart, 868 S.W.2d at 326).
132. 699 S.W.2d 570, 579 (Tex. 1985).
133. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 22-23.
134. Id. at 22.
135. Id. at 23-24.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id.
138. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 24.
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damages if by some chance it breaches this duty. It will be extremely rare
that the denial or delay of an insurance claim will cause the death, griev-
ous physical injury, or financial ruin of the insured and even if such oc-
curred, that the insurer was actually aware that its action would probably
result in such devastation to the life of the insured. In redefining the
gross negligence standard for punitive damages in a bad faith case, the
court comes close to equating gross negligence to the statutory definition
of malice. One of the definitions of malice is "an act that is carried out by
the defendant with a flagrant disregard for the rights of others and with
actual awareness on the part of the defendant that the act will, in reason-
able probability, result in human death, great bodily harm, or property
damage. '139 To equate these terms would be improper since each has
different elements and typically malice is thought of as involving a higher,
more culpable mental state than gross negligence. 140
Arguably, the gross negligence requirements of Moriel would not need
to be proven if punitive damages were sought because a breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing was accompanied by intentional con-
duct, fraud or malice rather than gross negligence. This is so because the
court specifically recognized that punitive damages might be proper in
such circumstances and that it was writing only about the elements re-
quired to prove gross negligence. 141
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment for punitive damages
against Transportation because there was no evidence that Moriel had
suffered any harm other than "anxiety and embarrassment" because of
Transportation's unreasonable delay in paying his claims.' 42 Addition-
ally, the court did not find any evidence that Transportation was aware
that its delay would probably cause Moriel any extraordinary harm.
Rather than render a take-nothing judgment, the court remanded for a
new trial because of its significant change in the gross negligence
standard. 143
The court also adopted procedural standards in Moriel for assessing
and reviewing punitive damage awards to "ensure against excessive or
otherwise inappropriate awards."'1 44 While the court noted that the cur-
rent Texas procedures were inadequate to guard against disproportionate
punitive damages in relation to the offense, a jury instruction incorporat-
ing the Kraus factors1 45 is the one procedure that does pass constitutional
scrutiny.' 46 In fact, the jury instruction in this case was cited with ap-
proval by the court. 147
139. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001(6)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
140. See Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. 1984).
141. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 23 n.16.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 29.
145. See Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
146. Id. at 29 n.26.
147. The jury instruction read as follows:
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The first procedure adopted was the bifurcation of the amount of puni-
tive damages from all other issues.148 If a timely motion to bifurcate is
made, the first trial involves the issues of liability for actual damages, the
amount of actual damages, and liability for punitive damages. 149 If the
jury finds that the defendant is liable for punitive damages, a second trial
with the same jury is had to determine the amount of punitive dam-
ages. 150 It is only at this point that evidence is presented to the jury on
the net worth of the defendant. 15'
The next procedure adopted by the court 52 was to require the courts
of appeals, when conducting a factual sufficiency review of a punitive
damages award, to detail the relevant evidence and explain why the evi-
dence supports or does not support the punitive damages in light of the
factors announced in Alamo National Bank v. Kraus.153 The court was
also asked to change the burden of proof required for the recovery of
punitive damages from preponderance of the evidence to clear and con-
vincing. The court refused to do so in light of the legislature's recent re-
jection of this standard.' 54 The court also refused to require trial courts
to articulate their reasons for refusing to disturb a punitive damage award
because trial courts are already overworked and understaffed. 155 How-
ever, the court did urge the trial courts to make such findings to the ex-
tent practicable. 156
Although Transportation did not challenge the jury's finding that it had
no reasonable basis for delaying payment of Moriel's claims, the court did
discuss the nature of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Reaffirming
Viles v. Security National Insurance Co., 157 the court held that a bad faith
claim is separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim and the
resolution of one does not determine the other.' 58 According to the
The term "punitive damages" is an amount which you may, in your discre-
tion, award as an example to others and as a penalty or by way of punish-
ment, in addition to any amount you may have found as actual damages.
In determining that amount, you may consider-
1. the nature of the wrong,
2. the frequency of the wrongs committed,
3. the character of the conduct involved,
4. the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer,
5. the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned,
6. the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propri-
ety, and
7. the size of the award needed to deter similar wrongs in the future.
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 27 n.22.
148. Id. at 30.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 30.
152. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 31.
153. 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981).
154. Id. at 32.
155. Id. at 33.
156. Id.
157. 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990).
158. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 17.
1995] 1375
SMU LAW REVIEW
court, bad faith involves a breach of contract accompanied by an in-
dependent tort. 5 9 Bad faith, wrote the court, is not merely a bona fide
dispute regarding coverage, a determination that the insurer was simply
wrong in denying the claim, nor a "simple disagreement" between experts
regarding coverage. 16° Bad faith, instead, is when the insurer has "no
reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of the claim, and ... it
knew or should have known that fact.' 16'
Justice Doggett, joined by Justice Gammage, concurred in the judg-
ment to the extent that the system governing punitive damages needs im-
provement but disagreed with the majority's attempt to improve the
system.162 Justice Doggett agreed with the procedures adopted by the
majority to ensure fairness in the awards of punitive damages and would
have gone further to require the trial courts to articulate the reasons for
overruling a motion for new trial challenging punitive damages.163
Justice Doggett, however, opposed and disagreed with the majority's
standard of gross negligence. First, Justice Doggett criticized the require-
ment that the insurer's conduct result in an injury "independent and qual-
itatively different" from injury resulting from breach of contract and bad
faith before punitive damages can be recovered. 64 Justice Doggett could
find no Texas authority for this proposition, which he viewed as an at-
tempt to make it virtually impossible to recover punitive damages from
insurance companies.' 65
Justice Doggett also disapproved of the majority's decision to abolish
the ability to prove gross negligence with evidence of circumstances that
show the awareness of an extreme risk by a reasonable person rather
than just through evidence of the specific defendant's awareness. 66 Jus-
tice Doggett felt that doing away with this element of gross negligence
protects "those who choose not to be aware of the consequences of their
[conduct]."'1 67
After deciding Moriel, the court granted an insurer's application for
writ of error in Davis v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co.168 Davis sued Twin
City for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, and violations of article 21.21 and the DTPA because Twin City failed
to pay for a hot tub prescribed to her by her doctor. The jury found that
Twin City breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, but did not
award any damages for mental anguish. The jury awarded $100,000 in
159. Id.
160. Id. at 17-18.
161. Id. at 18 (Doggett, J., concurring) (citing Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) and Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d
210, 213 (Tex. 1988)).
162. Id. at 47.
163. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 34-35.
164. Id. at 40.
165. Id. at 40-41.
166. ld. at 41-44.
167. Id. at 44.
168. 865 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ granted).
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exemplary damages, but the trial court rendered judgment only for the
cost of the hot tub. The court of appeals modified the judgment to in-
clude the award of exemplary damages. 169
Twin City argued that Davis was not entitled to recover exemplary
damages because she recovered only insurance benefits, which are con-
tract damages. Before Davis could recover exemplary damages, asserted
Twin City, she had to recover damages resulting from the tort of bad
faith. The court held Davis did recover damages for Twin City's bad faith
since the supreme court in Vail170 held that the amount of benefits wrong-
fully withheld are damages, as a matter of law, flowing from an insurer's
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.17'
The Texas Supreme Court granted Twin City's application for writ of
error on two points.172 One claimed that the court of appeals erred in
awarding exemplary damages when the only actual damages recovered
were the wrongfully withheld insurance benefits. The other point of error
asserted that the court of appeals did not detail the relevant evidence and
explain why the evidence supported the punitive damages as required by
Moriel.
The court also granted writ in Nicolau173 on whether State Farm should
be liable for punitive damages.174 The jury found that State Farm mali-
ciously breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. On appeal, State
Farm argued that the evidence was insufficient to support this finding.
The court disagreed with State Farm because the evidence revealed that
when it hired Haag Engineering, State Farm was fully aware of Haag's
predisposition not to link foundation damage with plumbing leaks. There
was also evidence that State Farm was not interested in hearing about the
home's foundation problems when its representative was at the scene
overseeing the plumber hired by State Farm to determine whether a leak
existed. Furthermore, State Farm admitted that it never told Nicolau
about the additional living expense provision in the policy that would
have reimbursed him for living expenses caused by the home becoming
partially unlivable after the leak was discovered. 75
Interestingly, the jury was not asked whether State Farm was grossly
negligent when it acted in bad faith, but whether it maliciously breached
its duty. Malice was defined in accordance with section 41.001(6)(B) of
the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. 176 State Farm's point of error, how-
169. Id at 237.
170. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex. 1988).
171. Davis, 865 S.W.2d at 236.
172. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1207 (Sept. 17, 1994).
173. Nicolau v. State Farm Lloyds, 869 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1993,
writ granted).
174. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 965 (June 15, 1994).
175. Nicolau, 869 S.W.2d at 553.
176. "Malice" means "(B) an act that is carried out by the defendant with a flagrant
disregard for the rights of others and with actual awareness on the part of the defendant
that the act will, in reasonable probability, result in human death, great bodily harm, or
property damage." TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001(6)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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ever, asserts that punitive damages were improper because there was no
evidence that State Farm's conduct created an extreme risk of harm for
the Nicolaus. 77 However, "extreme risk of harm" is an element of gross
negligence, not malice. Moreover, as mentioned above, the supreme
court's opinion in Moriel dealt only with the elements of gross negligence,
not malice. Thus, this case presents the court an opportunity to explain
the elements of malice and how they differ from the Moriel elements of
gross negligence, if they do.
C. SCOPE OF THE DUTY
1. No Duty
As mentioned above, although the Texas Supreme Court has never rec-
ognized a cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing when an insurer fails to settle third-party claims against its in-
sured, the court in Soriano,178 without resolving this issue, held that even
if there is such a duty, Texas Farmers did not breach it179 Justice Cornyn,
however, wrote a concurring opinion in Soriano urging the court to di-
rectly hold that an insurer does not have a duty of good faith and fair
dealing to settle third-party claims. 180 According to Justice Cornyn, the
standard that has been adopted in this context is negligence, not the "no
reasonable basis" standard of good faith. 181 The good faith standard ap-
plies only to first-party claims, and to impose such a standard on third-
party claims "would result in the insured having to prove a higher level of
culpability than would be required to prove negligence. '182
In Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc.'83 the court was faced with the issue of
whether an independent adjuster firm hired by the insurer to handle its
claims owed the insured the same duty of good faith and fair dealing
owed by the insurer. Natividad sustained accidental injuries in the course
of her employment with Revco. Revco had workers' compensation insur-
ance with National Union, which had hired Alexsis to investigate, adjust,
and handle all claims of Revco employees. Because her claims were not
being timely paid, Natividad sued National Union, Alexsis, its adjuster
Steen, and Revco. After Natividad settled with National Union and
Revco, Alexsis and Steen moved for a summary judgment, claiming that
they did not owe Natividad a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
trial court rendered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
177. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 965 (June 15, 1994).
178. Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994). Since the initial
draft of this Article was written, the supreme court resolved this issue, holding that an
insurer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to a third-party claimant. Trans-
port Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 424 (Mar. 30, 1995).
179. Id. at 317.
180. Id. at 318-19 (Cornyn, J., concurring).
181. Id. at 319.
182. Id.
183. 875 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1994).
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According to the court, an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing
emanates from the special relationship between the insured and the in-
surer, which exists only because the insured and insurer are parties to a
contract. 184 "Without such a contract[,] there would be no 'special rela-
tionship' and[,] hence, no duty of good faith and fair dealing.' 85 Thus,
the court concluded that those not in contractual privity with the insured
owe no duty of good faith and fair dealing to the insured.' 86 In this case,
Natividad was not a party to a contract with Alexsis, but had contractual
privity with only her employer and National Union.187 There was a con-
tract between Alexsis and National Union, but because Natividad was not
a party to that contract, the court determined that there was no special
relationship between Natividad and Alexsis so as to create a duty of good
faith on the part of Alexsis to Natividad. 188
The court further held that National Union's duty of good faith and fair
dealing was non-delegable.' 89 Consequently, if an insurer contracts with
agents or contractors for the performance of claim handling services, "the
[insurer will be] liable for actions by those agents or contractors that
breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the insured by the
[insurer]."190
Justice Gammage, joined by Justices Hightower, Doggett, and Spector,
disagreed with the majority, arguing that contractual privity between the
parties is not required to give rise to the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing.' 91 According to Justice Gammage, "[t]he duty of good faith and fair
dealing 'emanates not from the terms of the insurance contract, but from
an obligation imposed in law as a result of a special relationship between
the parties governed or created by a contract.' 192 Although there was
no contract between Natividad and Alexsis, there was a contract whereby
Alexsis promised to handle the claims of the Revco employees in accord-
ance with the terms of the National Union policy. 1 93 Thus, when Alexsis
dealt with Natividad, the relationship was governed by the workers' com-
pensation insurance contract. 94
Justice Gammage also felt that Natividad was a beneficiary under the
contract between Alexsis and National Union.195 But, even if she were
not a beneficiary under the contract, Justice Gammage felt that there was
a special relationship between Alexsis and National Union because the
184. Id. at 697-98.
185. Id
186. Id. at 698.
187. Id.
188. Natividad, 875 S.W.2d at 698.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 700 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 700 (quoting Viles v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex.
1990)).
193. Natividad, 875 S.W.2d at 700.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 701.
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latter delegated to Alexsis the sole authority to evaluate, process, and
deny Natividad's claims.' 96 Justice Gammage wrote that "[tjhe reasoning
for recognizing the duty to the covered employee from the employer's
[insurer] extends as well to the [insurer's] agent, the adjusting company
[that] deals directly with the employee."'197
Justice Gammage also criticized the majority's conclusion that "be-
cause [the insurer can] be held liable for its agent's actions, no cause of
action is necessary against the agents themselves.' 198 Justice Gammage
felt that the actual wrongdoer must be punished in order to put an end to
the wrongdoing.199
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Emscor Manufacturing, Inc. v. Al-
liance Insurance Group2°° held that an excess liability insurer does not
owe the insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing because the excess
insurer had no duty under the policy to handle the liability claims made
against the insured.20' In a similar vein, the court in Texas Employers
Insurance Association v. Underwriting Members of Lloyds202 held, with
little discussion, that the excess insurer does not owe a duty of good faith
to the primary insurer.
2. Existence of Duty
In Union Bankers Insurance Co. v. Shelton203 the court held that an
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing extends to the cancellation of
insurance policies. Thus, a cause of action for breach of this duty exists
when the insurer wrongfully cancels an insurance policy without a reason-
able basis and the insurer knew, or should have known, about that fact.2°4
The court noted that the same reasons for imposing this duty on insurers
in the context of claims handling demanded that the duty extend to can-
cellation of policies. 205 Just as the insurer has exclusive control over the
evaluation, processing, and denial of claims, so too is the insured at the
insurer's mercy for the continuation of coverage. 206 According to the
court, there is unequal bargaining power between insurer and insured re-
garding the payment of claims and the continuation of coverage.20 7
Moreover, if the duty of good faith did not extend to the cancellation of
policies insurers could "avoid bad faith liability by cancelling the entire




199. Natividad, 875 S.W.2d at 701.
200. 879 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
201. Id. at 912-13.
202. 836 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
203. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1138, 1142 (June 22, 1994).




208. Union Bankers, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1143.
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In E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hale20 9 the court held that an employer
administering a self-insured plan assumed the role of an insurer and thus
owed the employees a duty of good faith and fair dealing in handling
claims under the plan.210 In this case, Hale was injured while working as
an E-Z Mart store manager. E-Z Mart had previously posted a notice
that it was changing to a self-insurance program for workers' compensa-
tion benefits. E-Z Mart paid Hale's benefits and began paying her ex-
penses. Later Hale was notified that E-Z Mart had stopped paying her
expenses because it had determined that her injury had not occurred in
the manner she had stated.
Hale sued E-Z Mart for, among other things, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The trial court entered judgment based on
the jury verdict awarding Hale $254,686.27, fifty weeks of compensation
benefits, and pre- and post-judgment interest. The court of appeals
affirmed.
E-Z Mart asserted that the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed
on insurers did not apply to it. According to the court, a duty of good
faith and fair dealing arises when a contract between parties expressly
provides the duty or when a special relationship exists between the par-
ties. 211 Texas law recognizes such a duty in an insured-insurer relation-
ship.212 As such, the question before the court was whether E-Z Mart,
through its self-insurance program, came under the same duty.213
According to the court, when E-Z Mart disposed of its insurance cover-
age for employees, it expressly assumed the role as its employees' work-
ers' compensation carrier.21 4 The court held, therefore, that E-Z Mart
placed itself in the position as insurer and thus owed a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to Hale and the other employees. 215
D. STANDARD OF CARE (NATURE OF THE DUTY)
Texas courts are not unanimous in their understanding of the precise
standard of care required by an insurer in order to fulfill its duty of good
faith. Some courts liken the duty of good faith to a negligence concept,
while others contend that it is different and requires less of the insurer
than the duty not to act negligently. For example, as mentioned above,
Justice Cornyn, in his concurring opinion in Soriano, drew a distinction
between the negligence standard applied to third-party duty to settle
cases (Stowers) and the no reasonable basis standard of bad faith.216 Ac-
cording to Justice Comyn the negligence standard applies only to Stowers
209. 883 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested),
210. Id. at 700.
211. Id. at 699.
212. Id
213. Id. at 700.
214. E-Z Mart, 883 S.W.2d at 700.
215. Id.




claims, while the no reasonable basis standard applies to first-party insur-
ance claims.217 Justice Comyn resisted applying a no reasonable basis
standard to third-party claims as this "would presumably supplant the
negligence standard recognized in Stowers, and would result in the in-
sured having to prove a higher level of culpability than would be required
to prove negligence." 218
The Corpus Christi Court in Nicolau219 implicitly recognized this dis-
tinction when it held that the limits on punitive damages found in the Tort
Reform Act 220 do not apply to a cause of action for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. Although the court did not expound on the
reasons for its conclusion, the reasoning becomes apparent when looking
at the Act. Section 41.002 provides that chapter 41, dealing with exem-
plary damages, applies only to the causes of action which are the subject
matter of section 33.001.221 Section 33.001 details the rules of compara-
tive responsibility in negligence, strict tort liability, strict products liabil-
ity, and breach of warranty cases. 222 If bad faith is not a negligence
action, then it does not fall within the causes of action mentioned in sec-
tion 33.001, and thus the punitive damage caps in chapter 41 do not apply.
While the Corpus Christi court did not state this as the reason for its
conclusion, this was the reasoning employed by the Houston court in Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crowe.223
The Texarkana court, however, in Universe Life Insurance Co. v.
Giles22 4 reached a contrary conclusion, deciding that chapter 41 did apply
to punitive damage awards for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing as this, according to the court, "is a negligent act."'225 The Texar-
kana court, like the Corpus Christi court, provided no analysis or reason-
ing to support its conclusion.
Each of these courts assumed either that bad faith is or is not a negli-
gent act and proceeded from that point. The only court to provide a basis
for such a position, either way, was the El Paso court in Brotherhood's
Relief and Compensation Fund v. Cawthorn.226 That court concluded that
a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not an act of negli-
gence since the Texas Supreme Court has never spoken of the duty in
terms of negligence whenever it has discussed the elements of this
duty.227 The court did note that in Arnold the court, when first recogniz-
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Nicolau v. State Farm Lloyds, 869 S.W.2d 543, 553 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1993, writ granted).
220. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (exemplary damages
cannot exceed four times actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater).
221. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
222. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
223. 857 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ dism'd, 863 S.W.2d 462
(Tex. 1993).
224. 881 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested).
225. Id. at 52.
226. 815 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
227. Id. at 258-59.
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ing the duty of good faith, relied on Stowers, which, of course, imposed
upon the insurer the duty not to negligently settle claims made against
the insured by third parties.228 Yet, the Arnold court did not use terms of
negligence to describe a cause of action for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.229 Additionally, the court noted that the supreme
court in Aranda relied upon Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck,230
which held that the common law imposes a duty to perform a contract in
a non-negligent manner.231 Moreover, Aranda held that this same duty
of care applies to insurance contracts.2 32 Yet again, the Aranda court did
not use the term "negligence" to formulate the duty of good faith.2 33
Thus, the El Paso court concluded that "the decision to pay or deny the
claim does not involve negligence. '2 34
The distinction between a negligence standard in third-party claims and
a no reasonable basis standard in first-party insurance, if one truly exists,
makes little sense. There is no rationale in requiring less of the insurer
when handling claims submitted by its own insured than when handling
claims made against its insured. Both the Stowers duty and the duty of
good faith and fair dealing were imposed by law because of the special
relationship that exists between the insurer and the insured that arises out
of the insurer's unequal bargaining power over the insured. The founda-
tion of the court's decisions in Stowers and Arnold was that the respective
duties are required to prevent the insurer from abusing its exclusive con-
trol over the handling of claims, whether they be first or third-party
claims.235 The similarities between Stowers and Arnold are obvious from
the following quotes from each case. Stowers states:
[I]t would certainly be a very harsh rule to say that the indemnity
company, in a case such as this, owed no duty whatever to the in-
sured further than the face of the policy, regardless of whether it was
negligent in discharging its duties as the sole and exclusive agent of
the assured, in full and complete control. Such exclusive authority to
act in a case of this kind does not necessarily carry with it the right to
act arbitrarily. 236
Similarly, the Arnold court states:
In the insurance context a special relationship arises out of the
parties' unequal bargaining power and the nature of insurance con-
tracts which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of
their insureds' misfortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution
of claims. In addition, without such a cause of action insurers can
arbitrarily deny coverage and delay payment of a claim with no more
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 204 S.W.2d 508 (1947).




235. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547; Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
236. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547.
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penalty than interest on the amount owed. An insurance company
has exclusive control over the evaluation, processing and denial of
claims.237
In Stowers, the court concluded that an insurer will be "held to that
degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence
would exercise in the management of his own business" when it came to
settle claims made against the insured.238 Similarly, the court in Aranda
held that one element of whether an insurer has breached the duty of
good faith "requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable
insurer under similar circumstances would have delayed or denied the
claimant's benefits. ' 239 Although the court did not mention the word
"negligence," this element clearly incorporates a negligence standard into
the duty of good faith.
There is, of course, a second, subjective element to bad faith which
requires the insured to prove that the insurer knew or, based on its duty
to investigate, should have known that there was no reasonable basis for
the delay or denial. 240 Whatever this element adds to the negligence stan-
dard of the first element, it clearly is not a requirement to prove inten-
tional or even grossly negligent conduct, since the court in Moriel held
that the insurer, when it denies a claim without a reasonable basis, en-
gages in bad faith and more must be shown to prove gross negligence,
malice or intentional conduct.241
Many of the difficulties facing the courts concerning the duty of good
faith could be resolved by treating them as the Stowers duty; that is, ap-
plying a negligence standard of care. This would eliminate the problem
the courts are having in analyzing whether the insured has proven a nega-
tive proposition: "no reasonable basis." It would also harmonize the du-
ties owed by the insurer to its insured regardless of the type of claim
being submitted. Adoption of the negligence standard for bad faith
would also subject this cause of action to tort reform, thereby limiting the
amount of punitive damages that could be recovered against the insurer
and permitting the insurer to submit to the jury an issue on comparative
causation. If bad faith is treated as something distinct from negligence,
there is no basis for an insurer to plead or submit to the jury the insured's
percentage fault (or comparative bad faith). Chapter 33 of the Texas
Civil Practices and Remedies Code clearly would exclude this cause of
action from its application.242 Even so, many insurers are claiming that
the insured has a corresponding duty of good faith. This has no support
in Texas jurisprudence and, in fact, collides with Arnold and all subse-
quent cases which have imposed the duty only on the insurer.
237. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
238. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 548.
239. Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1988).
240. lId
241. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriei, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 n.16 (Tex. 1994).
242. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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II. DUTY TO SETTLE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS
(STOWERS DUTY)
A. ELEMENTS OF A STOWERS CAUSE OF ACrION
Soon after the court decided American Physicians Insurance Exchange
v. Garcia,243 where the court held that the Stowers duty is not triggered
unless a settlement demand is within policy limits, the court decided
Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Soriano.244 One of the issues in this case
was whether the insurer breached its Stowers duty when it refused to set-
tle with one claimant for the $20,000 policy limits after it had already
settled with another claimant for $5000. In addressing this issue, the
court reiterated the three elements of a Stowers cause of action stated in
American Physicians: (1) a-claim against an insured is within the scope of
coverage; (2) there is a demand within policy limits; and (3) the terms of
the demand are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it,
considering the likelihood of an excess judgment.245
The court concluded that, when faced with a settlement demand arising
out of multiple claims and inadequate proceeds, an insurer may enter into
a reasonable settlement with one of the several claimants, even if the set-
tlement decreases the amount available to satisfy other claims.246 The
court believed that this approach will "promote[ ] settlement of lawsuits
and encourage[ ] claimants to make their claims promptly. 247
Farmers left $15,000 in available limits to satisfy the Medinas' claims
after settling the Lopez claim. The court listed two reasons it might possi-
bly find that Farmers negligently failed to settle the Medinas' claim: (1)
Farmers negligently rejected a demand from the Medinas within policy
limits; or (2) the Lopez settlement was unreasonable.248 According to the
court, there was no evidence to reach either conclusion.
249
Although the evidence indicated that Farmers might have been able to
settle the Medinas' claims for $20,000 prior to the Lopez settlement, there
was no evidence that the Medinas ever demanded $20,000 before the Lo-
pez settlement. 250 Without evidence of a demand within the policy limits
prior to the Lopez settlement, Farmers had no duty to settle the Medinas'
claims for $20,000, or for greater than $15,000 after the Lopez settle-
ment.25' Therefore, the court held that Farmers did not negligently reject
a demand within policy limits. 252
243. 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994). American Physicians was discussed in last year's an-
nual review. See Maxwell, supra note 16, at 1404.
244. 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
245. Id at 314.
246. Id. at 315.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d at 315.
250. Id.
251. Id at 315-16.
252. Id. at 316.
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The court further held that there was no evidence that the Lopez settle-
ment was unreasonable. 253 Soriano claimed that the Lopez settlement
was unreasonable when compared to the more serious Medina claims.
However, said the court, the fact that the Medinas' claims might have
been more serious was not evidence that the Lopez claim was unreasona-
ble. 254 According to the court, Soriano must have shown "that a reason-
ably prudent insurer would not have settled the Lopez claim when
considering solely the merits of [that] claim and the potential liability of
its insured on the claim. '255 The court concluded that there was no evi-
dence that Farmers' decision to settle the Lopez wrongful death claim for
$5000 was unreasonable.256
Justice Hightower concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the
court's analysis of an insurer's duty to settle for the same reasons he gave
in his dissent in American Physicians.2 57 In American Physicians, Justice
Hightower wrote that the Stowers duty includes the duty to explore set-
tlement possibilities and thus, an insurer should not be allowed to wait
until a demand within policy limits is made before engaging in reasonable
attempts to settle.258
B. COVENANT NOT TO EXECUTE
Although Soriano assigned his rights to the Medinas in exchange for a
covenant not to execute, Farmers did not raise an issue concerning the
affects of such covenant upon Soriano's damages. One might recall that
this was an issue written on by the Texas Supreme Court in its first opin-
ion in American Physicians. Justice Hightower, writing the majority opin-
ion, found that the American Physicians Insurance Exchange (APIE)
breached its Stowers duty and that a covenant not to execute did not ne-
gate Garcia's damages. 259 On rehearing, a majority of the court found
that APIE did not breach its Stowers duty and thus did not reach the issue
of the covenant not to execute. Justice Hightower, however, in his now
dissenting opinion incorporated his discussion regarding the covenant not
to execute from the first opinion.260 This issue may soon be resolved as
the court has granted the application for writ of error in State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Gandy.261
One of State Farm's points of error upon which the application for writ
was granted was that the lower courts erred in rendering judgment
against State Farm because the person who obtained a judgment against
State Farm's insured agreed to a covenant not to execute in exchange for
253. Id. at 316.
254. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d at 316.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 318 (Hightower, J., concurring in judgment only).
258. American Physicians, 876 S.W.2d at 863-64.
259. American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 406 (Dec. 31, 1992).
260. American Physicians, 876 S.W.2d at 867-72 (Hightower, J., dissenting).
261. 880 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ granted).
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the insured's rights against State Farm. In this case, Julie Gandy sued
Pearce, her stepfather, alleging that he had repeatedly abused her sexu-
ally. Pearce requested that State Farm defend him. State Farm provided
homeowner's insurance to Pearce, and Gandy alleged that some of the
sexual abuse occurred at his home. State Farm eventually decided to de-
fend Pierce, but reserved its right to deny coverage based on the policy
exclusion for intentional conduct.
Gandy brought this lawsuit against State Farm, as assignee of Pearce,
on the basis that State Farm had failed to provide Pearce an adequate
defense. Gandy obtained favorable jury findings and a judgment was
rendered against State Farm. State Farm argued to the court of appeals
that Gandy failed to prove that its conduct proximately caused Pearce
damage. Gandy's theory was that the amount of the agreed judgment
that she took against Pearce, which amounted to about $6 million, consti-
tuted actual damages to Pearce. The court questioned whether Pearce
suffered any damages from the judgment because of Gandy's covenant
not to execute.262 However, the court deferred to the supreme court's
first opinion in Garcia, which held that a covenant not to execute does
not eliminate the judgment debtor's damages.263
C. TURNOVER
In Charles v. Tamez264 the court held that unasserted, denied Stowers
causes of action are not assets subject to turnover. Gilberto and Gloria
Charles sued Raul Tamez after Mr. Charles was paralyzed from an auto-
mobile accident. Mr. Charles was a passenger in a car driven by Tamez,
who negligently turned left into the path of an on-coming truck. Tamez
was insured by Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Company.
Farmers hired the law firm of Adams & Graham to represent and defend
Tamez against the Charles suit.
Little more than one month after suit was filed, Mr. Charles died from
his injuries. On March 25, 1991, Mrs. Charles's attorneys hand-delivered
a Stowers letter to Adams & Graham offering to settle all claims brought
personally and on behalf of her deceased husband against Tamez for
Tamez's policy limits of $20,000. Adams & Graham did not accept Mrs.
Charles's offer within the allotted time and the case went to trial. Judg-
ment was rendered on the jury verdict in favor of Mrs. Charles, individu-
ally and on behalf of her husband's estate, against Tamez for over
$180,000. No appeal was perfected and the judgment became final. The
judgment amount in excess of the policy limits remains unsatisfied.
Postjudgment discovery indicated that Tamez had no nonexempt assets
subject to execution other than the causes of action Tamez possessed
against Farmers and other persons responsible for the Stowers breach,
such as the law firm of Adams & Graham. Mrs. Charles sought to reach
262. Id. at 137-38.
263. Id. at 138.
264. 878 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied).
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those assets by initiating the proceeding for a court-ordered turnover.
Adams & Graham continued to represent Tamez on the turnover motion
and opposed the requested turnover. In connection with this motion,
Tamez testified by affidavit that he was not dissatisfied with Farmers's or
Adams & Graham's representation of him. Tamez also testified that he
would not have permitted Farmers to settle for policy limits if such settle-
ment left him exposed to liens by the hospitals. The court granted turno-
ver to Mrs. Charles of Tamez's claims against Farmers and other parties
liable for the manner in which Farmers oversaw Tamez's defense. Tamez
moved for a new trial.
At a hearing on the motion for a new trial, the court modified the turn-
over order requiring an accounting to Tamez only of the excess proceeds
from the sale, not of any excess from the suits; otherwise the court contin-
ued to order a sheriff's sale of the causes of action. Adams & Graham
moved to intervene and to quash the sale. Tamez, now represented by
another attorney, also moved to quash the sale. Mrs. Charles moved to
strike the intervention of Adams & Graham, contending that it came af-
ter the final judgment and, was thus too late. The court allowed Adams
& Graham to intervene, quashed the sale of the causes of action against
both Farmers and Adams & Graham, and denied the turnover. The court
of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals recognized that a cause of action is a property
right and can be subject to turnover under the turnover statute.265 Under
the statute, Mrs. Charles had only to show that Tamez owned the causes
of action, which were not exempt or susceptible to normal attachment or
levy to justify turnover.266 The court, in affirming the denial of the turno-
ver, did not conclude that Mrs. Charles had failed to meet this burden of
proof, but that public policy barred the turnover of the causes of action in
this case because Tamez did not want to assert, and in fact, denied that he
had a cause of action against his attorneys for legal malpractice or against
his insurer for failure to settle the lawsuit.267 The court concluded that
Tamez must first decide that his lawyers acted contrary to his interest
before deciding whether to sue for any malpractice. 26s According to
Tamez's testimony, his attorneys acted according to his wishes. The court
held, therefore, that unless Tamez was proven incompetent, he alone
could determine if he believed that his counsel misrepresented him.
269
Thus, the court held that "unasserted, denied causes of action for legal
malpractice for failure to settle under the Stowers doctrine are not assets
subject to turnover. '270 According to the court, "allowing a party to
force a suit for malpractice on behalf of a satisfied opponent does not
265. Charles, 878 S.W.2d at 205; see TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon
1986 & Supp. 1994).
266. Id.
267. Charles, 878 S.W.2d at 208.
268. Id at 207.
269. Id.
270. Charles, 878 S.W.2d at 208.
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promote the specific purpose of the turnover statute or the overall pur-
pose of the Texas legal system."'271
The court recognized that an insured's right to sue his insurer for fail-
ure to settle under Stowers is subject to both equitable subrogation and
assignment. 272 But, it is not subject to involuntary assertion. 273 Again,
Tamez testified that he had no complaint regarding Farmers.274 As with
the attorneys, the court held that public policy bars turnover of unas-
serted, denied causes of action against insurers for failure to settle law-
suits.275 The court affirmed the trial court's denial of turnover,
reasoning that Tamez had not been shown to be incompetent, and
Tamez's cause of action would wither into an "insubstantial illusion," a
"hollow lawsuit," in the face of his state satisfaction with his representa-
tives.276 The effect of that reasoning is to place a greater burden of proof
upon a similarly-situated turnover applicant than Texas law demands,
that is, the applicant must: (1) show the judgment debtor to be incompe-
tent; and (2) prove the merits of the action in the turnover proceeding.
The turnover statute, and all Texas cases discussing burden of proof in
a turnover proceeding, requires only slight evidentiary showing-merely
"some evidence" of possession or control of the subject asset.277 A turn-
over order can issue even when no evidence has been presented. 278 At
most, a judgment creditor should show: (1) that the judgment debtor
owns the subject property; (2) that the property cannot readily be at-
tached; and (3) that the property is not exempt from attachment, execu-
tion, and other seizure. 279 In seeking turnover of a chose in action, a
judgment creditor only has to show that the judgment debtor owns it.280
The applicant has no duty to prove its merits or lack of defenses28' or its
value.282 The purpose of the turnover proceeding is merely to ascertain
whether or not an asset is in the possession of the judgment debtor or
subject to the debtor's control.28 3 Moreover, once -a judgment creditor
presents evidence tracing the assets to the judgment debtor, a presump-
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Charles, 878 S.W.2d at 208.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 209.
277. Brink v. Ayre, 855 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
278. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (the lack of
any evidence is only a relevant consideration in determining whether the trial court should
not have granted turnover).
279. Brink, 855 S.W.2d at 45; see also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994).
280. Brink, 855 S.W.2d at 45.
281. Renger Memorial Hospital v. State, 674 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984,
no writ).
282. Associated Ready Mix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. App.-Waco
1992, orig. proceeding).
283. Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 227.
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tion arises that those assets are in the debtor's possession and the burden
then shifts to him to account for the assets.284
The effect of this court's opinion, whenever a judgment debtor decides
to oppose turnover of his chose in action by denying that it exists or re-
fusing to assert it, is to force the turnover applicant to further prove the
merit of the action and that the judgment debtor is incompetent. The
court's pronouncement is wrong because it conflicts with the established
case law and because the holding changes the purely procedural nature of
the turnover statute, intended to assist judgment creditors in the collec-
tion of their judgment debts, into a complex, substantive procedure. In a
case such as this, the burden of production of the asset improperly shifts
from the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor, who must prove to
the trial court a great likelihood the action will succeed.
The foundation of the court's opinion is that Raul Tamez, the insured,
stated in affidavit that he had no complaints against Farmers and his law-
yers for the way they handled his case. Such claims by a judgment debtor
should never be the basis for denying turnover of his choses in action.
One obvious reason is that any judgment debtor desiring to avenge his
judgment creditor can simply feign a desire not to press a lawsuit, so that
the creditor is unable to obtain the same on turnover.
The court of appeals has incorrectly, and without precedent, held that a
judgment creditor may not use the turnover statute to reach the judgment
debtor's Stowers action if the judgment debtor does not want to bring the
action himself. Holding that a lawsuit under the Stowers doctrine is "es-
sentially personal" 285 and not subject to involuntary assertion by turno-
ver, the court legislated a novel, unprecedented class of exempt
property-"unasserted, denied causes of action for failure to settle [law-
suit]."' 286 This holding conflicts with the sole authority of the Legislature
to create property exemptions. This holding will also invite inevitable
abuse. Any insurance company whose negligence has caused an excess
judgment to be entered against the insured can rely on this case and do
what was apparently done here-somehow make the insured happy with
the insurer and then thwart any turnover attempts to reach the insured's
causes of action. This holding exempting "unasserted, denied" causes of
action from turnover may endanger our settled public policy goals of pro-
tecting insureds.
It is true that after Charles was decided, the Texas Supreme Court re-
fused an application for writ of error in Zuniga v. Groce, Locke &
Hebdon,287 and thus adopted the holding that a client may not assign a
cause of action against his or her attorney for legal malpractice. How-
ever, the same concerns that prevented such an assignment cannot impact
the assignability of a Stowers action or its acquisition through turnover.
284. Id. at 226.
285. Charles, 878 S.W.2d at 208.
286. Id.
287. 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd).
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In Zuniga, the court concluded that an assignment of a legal malprac-
tice cause of action will not be permitted because it would cause "a
demeaning reversal of roles. '288 After the client, now a judgment debtor,
assigned his legal malpractice cause of action to his opponent, now a
judgment creditor, the client would have to take the position that but for
his attorney's negligence, he would have successfully prevailed against
the allegations being made against him.289 The judgment creditor, on the
other hand, would have to abandon any notion that the merits of his case
were strong enough to win on and instead argue that he would have lost
except for the defendant's attorney's negligence. 29° According to the
court, allowing such conduct to occur solely to find a party with sufficient
assets to pay a judgment would demean the legal profession by giving the
public the idea that lawyers "will take any position, depending upon
where the money lies, and that litigation is a mere game and not a search
for the truth."291 Allowing a judgment creditor like Mrs. Charles to ob-
tain by turnover causes of action belonging to her judgment debtor would
not demean the legal profession as feared by the San Antonio court. Mrs.
Charles tried to obtain by turnover Mr. Tamez's cause of action against
his insurer for its negligent failure to settle the personal injury and wrong-
ful death claims brought against him by Mr. & Mrs. Charles. As it so
happened, the reason Farmers did not respond to the Stowers demand
was because of Adams & Graham's negligence in not timely communicat-
ing the offer. Thus, this case focuses on acquiring a Stowers cause of ac-
tion. Consequently, Mrs. Charles did not have to take a position contrary
to the one she took in the underlying lawsuit. That is, she does not have
to allege that she would not have been successful in obtaining a judgment
against Mr. Tamez but for the negligence of Adams & Graham. Instead,
she only had to agree with Mr. Tamez that but for the negligence of Farm-
ers and Adams & Graham, she would have settled the underlying lawsuit
for Farmers's policy limits of $20,000. This is not contrary to any position
Mrs. Charles took in the underlying lawsuit since she did, in fact, attempt
to settle with Mr. Tamez for that amount. Thus, the public policy reasons
stated in Zuniga and adopted by this Court had no impact on Mrs.
Charles's ability to acquire Mr. Tamez's Stowers cause of action, whether
by assignment or by turnover.
III. UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS
(ARTICLE 21.21 & THE DTPA)
A. STANDING TO SUE
As discussed in detail in last year's Annual Survey, the Texas Supreme
Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watson292 determined that a third-party




292. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994).
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claimant cannot assert a cause of action for unfair claim settlement prac-
tices under article 21.21 of the DTPA against the alleged wrongdoer's
insurer.293 In addressing this issue, the court noted to maintain an action
under section 16 of article 21.21, the conduct must be:
1. declared to be unfair or deceptive in section 4 of article 21.21;
2. defined in the rules and regulations adopted by the State Board of
Insurance to be unfair or deceptive; or
3. defined by DTPA section 17.46 as an unlawful deceptive trade
practice.294
The court first concluded that unfair claims settlement practices are not
declared to be unfair or deceptive by section 4.295 Next, the court deter-
mined that Board Order 18663, which was promulgated under article
21.21, does not specifically address unfair claims settlement practices.296
The court did note that Board Order 41454 does define conduct that con-
stitutes unfair claims settlement practices, but this was promulgated
under article 21.21-2, not article 21.21.297 The court, therefore, concluded
that it could not form the basis of an article 21.21 cause of action.298 The
court also mentioned that article 21.21-2, itself, defines and prohibits un-
fair claims settlement practices. 299 However, article 21.21-2 does not pro-
vide a private cause of action. 3°°
As to the final possible cause of action under article 21.21, conduct
defined by DTPA section 17.46 as deceptive trade practices, the court
held that since unfair claims settlement practices are not listed in section
17.46(b), they are not actionable under article 21.21 through the
DTPA.301 Thus, the court eliminated the possibility of maintaining a
cause of action under section 17.46(a) for unlisted deceptive trade
practices.
Significantly, the court was careful to limit its opinion to claims being
asserted by third-party claimants and indicated that it was not disturbing
the law regarding the causes of action an insured can maintain against his
or her insurer. According to the court, Ms. Watson was required to assert
her cause of action "through the reasoning of Vail."'302 The court
explained:
Vail thus presented the question of construction of art. 21.21, section
16 in the context of an insured-insurer relationship and in light of the
preexisting common law duty of good faith and fair dealing recog-
nized in Arnold. In reaching our decision today, we are particularly
mindful of the duties imposed on insurers as to their insureds....
293. Id. at 150.
294. Id at 147 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
295. Id. at 147.
296. Id. at 148.
297. Allstate, 876 S.W.2d at 148.
298. Id
299. Id.
300. Id. at 148-49.
301. Id at 149.
302. Allstate, 876 S.W.2d at 149.
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Vail is predicated upon this Court's expressed belief that a special
relationship exists between an insured and the insurer.... Vail re-
mains the law as to claims for alleged unfair claim settlement prac-
tices brought by insureds against their insurers. 30 3
The court in VaiP°4 held that there are several possible avenues for an
insured to maintain a cause of action against his or her insurer for unfair
claims settlement practices under article 21.21, section 16, either directly
or by its incorporation through DTPA section 17.50(a)(4):
1. By Board Order 18663's 305 incorporation of article 21.21-2's pro-
hibition of unfair claims settlement practices;
2. By Board Order 18663's incorporation of Board Order 41454's306
prohibition of unfair claims settlement practices;
3. By Board Order 18663's incorporation of a breach of the common
law duty of good faith and fair dealing; and
4. By article 21.21, section 16's incorporation of unlisted deceptive
trade practices prohibited by DTPA section 17.46(a). 307
In Wheelways Insurance Co. v. Hodges,30 8 the court relied on Watson to
deny relief under article 21.21 to a judgment creditor and assignee of the
insured. Hodges was injured in a car accident caused by Harvey, who was
driving a rental car owned by Capps Rent-A-Car. Wheelways provided
primary coverage to Capps, authorized users of Capps's vehicles, and
those vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of Capps or its author-
ized users. Wheelways, however, refused to provide coverage under this
policy for Hodges' injuries, and she sued Harvey. Hodges obtained a de-
fault judgment against Harvey in the amount of $250,000. Harvey then
assigned his rights against Wheelways to Hodges and she proceeded to
file suit against it alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, negligence, and violations of the DTPA and the
Insurance Code.
The jury found for Hodges on theories of negligence and violations of
the DTPA and the Insurance Code. The jury also awarded Hodges
$200,000 damages for her mental anguish, punitive damages, and attor-
ney's fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Concerning the issue of whether Hodges could recover damages for
her mental anguish under article 21.21, the court simply dismissed this
claim as one being asserted by a third-party claimant who, according to
Watson, does not have "standing to sue to enforce the extracontractual
obligations, rights, and remedies imposed by Article 21.21. '309 The
supreme court's holding in Watson was not so expansive, but was limited
to refusing to allow third-party claimants to sue another person's insurer
for unfair claims settlement practices. The supreme court did not rule the
303. Id (citations omitted).
304. Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
305. Codified at 28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3 (West 1994).
306. Codified at 28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 21.203 (West 1994).
307. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 136.
308. 872 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no writ).
309. Id at 782.
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possibility of a third-party claimant suing the insurer for violations of sec-
tion 4 of article 21.21, Board Order. 18663 or DTPA section 17.46(b).
Moreover, Hodges's status was not identical to Watson's. Ms. Watson
sued Townsley's insurer before she had litigated the issue of his negli-
gence or obtained a judgment against him. Hodges did obtain a judgment
establishing Harvey's negligence and the damages resulting therefrom.
Thus, as a judgment creditor, Hodges stepped into Harvey's shoes. Addi-
tionally, Harvey assigned his causes of action against Wheelways to
Hodges.
A similar situation was presented in Emscor Manufacturing, Inc. v. Al-
liance Insurance Group.310 Alliance provided excess liability coverage to
Emscor, which was facing a claim by the families of two employees who
died on the job (the Ketcher plaintiffs). After Emscor's primary carrier
became insolvent, Emscor demanded that Alliance tender its policy limits
to settle with the Ketcher plaintiffs. Alliance refused and Emscor and the
Ketcher plaintiffs entered into an agreed judgment.
After suing Alliance for its refusal to settle, Emscor assigned seventy-
five percent of any recovery it might obtain to the Ketcher plaintiffs and
they joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs. Alliance moved for summary judg-
ment, asserting that Emscor failed to meet the conditions of coverage
under the policy. The trial court granted this motion and the court of
appeals affirmed the summary judgment.
The majority of the court, in one sentence found in a footnote, con-
cluded that the Ketcher plaintiffs had no standing to sue Alliance under
article 21.21 based on Watson.311 The dissent, however, argued that the
Ketcher plaintiffs were not third-party claimants per se because Emscor
had assigned some of its contractual rights to them.312 "As Emscor's as-
signees, the Ketcher plaintiffs can enforce the obligations and duties that
Alliance owed to Emscor under the excess coverage policy. ' 31 3
Another case extending Watson beyond its narrow holding is Hancock
v. Walker.314 This mandamus proceeding was brought by Risk Managers
International to compel the trial court to vacate or stay his order requir-
ing it to post a $2 million bond. In the underlying lawsuit, the Trans sued
Morgan and his employer after the Trans' sons were killed in an automo-
bile accident. The Trans added Risk Managers and Corporate Underwrit-
ers alleging violations of article 21.21 and the DTPA, and breached the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Upon the Trans request, the trial
court required Risk Managers, as an unauthorized insurer, to post a bond
pursuant to article 1.14-1 section 6(a) and article 1.36 section 11(a) of the
Insurance Code.
310. 879 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
311. Id. at 910 n.6.
312. Id. at 919.
313. Id. at 919-20.
314. 873 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, orig. proceeding).
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The court of appeals granted the writ of mandamus, holding that the
Trans lacked standing to invoke the bond requirements of the Texas In-
surance Code.315 According to the court, the Trans, as third-party claim-
ants, have standing under the Insurance Code, only if they allege acts or
practices enumerated in article 21.21 section 16 and demonstrates reli-
ance on those acts.316 Unlike Ms. Watson, who asserted a claim for unfair
claims settlement practices, which is not specifically enumerated in article
21.21 section 16, the Trans alleged that Risk Managers engaged in con-
duct declared unfair in section 4 of article 21.21, a claim specifically enu-
merated in section 16.317 However, the court determined that the Trans
could not show damage from relying on Risk Managers' representations,
"because the underlying claim arose in tort. '318
The same attempt to impose a reliance element onto the DTPA failed
when it was first tried almost ten years ago in Weitzel v. Barnes319 and
when it was tried in 1994 in Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats.320 In Weit-
zel, the defendant argued that a consumer had to prove reliance on a
misrepresentation before there could be recovery under the DTPA. The
court, looking to the language of the statute, disagreed. The court noted
that the DTPA allows recovery when there is proof of a deceptive act or
practice that is a producing cause of the consumer's actual damages.
321
Producing cause does not contain an element of reliance and, in fact, the
Legislature rejected a reliance standard in favor of a producing cause
standard. 322 Thus, the court held that courts should not impose require-
ments rejected by the Legislature. 323 When the same argument was made
to the supreme court last year in Celtic Life, the court reaffirmed its deci-
sion in Weitzel that reliance is not an element of recovery under the
DTPA.
3 2 4
In Hart v. Berko, Inc.,325 the El Paso Court of Appeals took the hold-
ing of Watson that article 21.21, section 16 makes actionable conduct that
is defined as an unlawful deceptive trade practice in DTPA section 17.46,
which implicitly rejected the holding in Vail, that unlisted practices under
DTPA section 17.46(a) are actionable under article 21.21, and applied it
to an action brought by an insured against an insurance agent for alleged
misrepresentations. The court thus concluded that only the conduct pro-
hibited by DTPA section 17.46(b) is actionable under article 21.21, sec-
tion 16.326 The court seemingly recognized the internal inconsistency of
315. Id. at 424.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 424.
319. 691 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1985).
320. 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994).
321. Weitzel, 691 S.W.2d at 600.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Celtic Life, 885 S.W.2d at 99.
325. 881 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
326. Id. at 509.
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Watson in eliminating a cause of action under article 21.21 for unlisted
practices under DTPA section 17.46(a), which Vail permitted, and the
holding that "Vail remains the law as to claims for alleged unfair claim
settlement practices brought by insureds against their insurers. '327 The
El Paso court's resolution of this inconsistency was to view Watson as
modifying Vail rather than allowing Vail to remain intact for insureds.
328
Tri-Legends Corp. v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. 329 and Crum & Forster,
Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,330 present opposing views on the extent of the ap-
plication of Watson to claims brought by an insured against his or her
insurer. Tri-Legends sued Ticor for an alleged misrepresentation in a title
commitment. The commitment stated that record title of property Tri-
Legends wanted to purchase appeared to be vested in Allied Bank, the
entity offering to sell the property to Tri-Legends. The actual record title
owner of the tract when it was purchased by Tri-Legends was actually the
Russell King Development Corporation. Tri-Legends claimed that this
title defect thwarted its attempts to develop and market condominiums
on the tract of land, which was the reason for purchasing the property.
In affirming a summary judgment in favor of Ticor, the court of appeals
held that Tri-Legends had not alleged any viable causes of action under
article 21.21 or the DTPA. Taking its cue from Watson, the court held that
conduct actionable under article 21.21, section 16 are those acts declared
unfair or deceptive in section 4 of article 21.21 and the rules and regula-
tions of the State Board of Insurance promulgated under article 21.21, or
those acts defined by DTPA section 17.46 as being false, misleading or
deceptive.
In Watson, the court held that section 4 of article 21.21 "is an exclusive
list of statutory unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of
insurance. ''331 The Tri-Legends court concluded from that statement that
since section 4 does not mention misrepresentations in title commitments
that Tri-Legends had not alleged any violations of section 4.332
Tri-Legends also sought damages for Ticor's alleged violation of Board
Order 41060,333 which prohibits misrepresentations of insurance policies.
The court held that this Board Order does not prohibit any conduct in
addition to the conduct prohibited in article 21.21 or other rules and regu-
lations, and thus does not make actionable misrepresentations in a title
commitment. 334 Such an interpretation of this Board Order- renders it
meaningless.
The court next concluded that Tri-Legends could not recover under the
DTPA because section 17.46(b) does not specifically state that a misrep-
327. Watson, 876 S.W.2d at 149.
328. Hart, 881 S.W.2d at 508-09.
329. 889 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
330. 887 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested).
331. Watson, 876 S.W.2d at 147.
332. Tri-Legends, 889 S.W.2d at 440.
333. Codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3 (West 1994).
334. Tri-Legends, 889 S.W.2d at 440.
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resentation in a title commitment is a prohibited false, misleading, or de-
ceptive act or practice. 335 The court misunderstands the purpose and
intent of the laundry list items in section 17.46(b). They are designed to
be broad and categorical rather than referring to specific acts and must be
liberally construed "due to human inventiveness in engaging in deceptive
or misleading conduct. ' 336 This court, by applying a narrow, tortured
construction to the DTPA, circumvents the legislature's intent of protect-
ing consumers by allowing unwarranted loopholes in the statute.
The Texarkana court in Monsanto, on the other hand, refused to im-
pose such a narrow construction on these statutes, holding that Watson is
applicable only to those claims for unfair claim settlement practices as-
serted by third-party claimants and that Vail still governs causes of action
brought by insureds against their insurers.337 Consequently, the court
held that an insured still has a cause of action under article 21.21 for un-
listed deceptive trade practices under DTPA section 17.46(a).338
B. JURY QUESTIONS
In Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of America,339 the court was
faced with the issue of how to properly submit to the jury an insurer's
liability under article 21.21 and the DTPA. Charles and Sharon Spencer
sued Eagle Star for delaying payment of benefits owed under business
interruption coverage. The Spencers suffered a fire loss at their business
on February 19, 1986, but Eagle Star did not unconditionally tender pay-
ment of the benefits until March 10, 1987.
Eagle Star's liability was submitted in the following question:
Was the handling of the Spencers' claim for loss of earnings by Eagle
Star an unfair practice in the business of insurance? "Unfair prac-
tice" means any act, or series of acts which is arbitrary, without justi-
fication, or takes advantage of a person to the extent that an unjust
or inequitable result is obtained. 340
The jury answered this question in the affirmative but the trial court
granted Eagle Star's post-verdict motion for judgment or for judgment
n.o.v., on the basis that the question "'does not support a judgment
against the Defendant under our law,' and rendered a take-nothing judg-
ment."'3 1 The Spencers appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the question was immaterial and defective. 342 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 34 3
335. Id. at 441-42.
336. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Tex. 1980).
337. Monsanto, 887 S.W.2d at 117-18 n.10.
338. Id at 118.
339. 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994).
340. Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 780 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989), rev'd, 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994).
341. Id. at 839.
342. I at 843-44.
343. Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 155.
1995] 1397
SMU LAW REVIEW
The supreme court agreed with the lower courts that the question and
instruction were defective because the instruction did not specify the con-
duct made unlawful.34 4 Citing Brown v. American Transfer & Storage
Co.,345 the court held that "[w]hen liability is asserted based upon a pro-
vision of a statute or regulation, a jury charge should track the language
of the provision as closely as possible. '346
Accordingly, the court found the instruction was too broad and ill-de-
fined as it allowed the jury to find an unfair insurance practice based on
conduct that took advantage of the Spencers and resulted in an inequita-
ble result. 34 7 The court noted that article 21.21, section 16, "does not
refer to every [unfair or deceptive] practice imagined but only to those
specified by other statutes and regulations. '34 8 Even so, the court con-
cluded that the question was not immaterial, as it submitted liability
under article 21.21-the heart of the Spencers' case. 34 9 Accordingly, the
supreme court held that the trial court should have granted a new trial,
rather than disregarding the jury's answer to the question and rendering a
judgment n.o.v. 350
On rehearing, Eagle Star argued that just as in State Department of
Highways v. Payne,351 the Spencers were not entitled to a new trial be-
cause they failed to properly submit their theory of liability. The court
distinguished Payne because the plaintiffs there had abandoned one basis
of liability by refusing to submit it over defendant's objection. 352 The
Spencers, however, did not abandon their claim under article 21.21 but
instead requested an improper submission of it to the jury.353
Eagle Star also complained that a new trial would give the Spencers "a
second bite at the apple. ' 354 This, the insurer asserted, would encourage
plaintiffs to request the submission of an erroneous question, knowing
that the only risk is a new trial. The court rejected this argument, holding
that the trial court had the responsibility to submit the proper questions
to the jury and the consequences of the trial court's error should not fall
upon the plaintiffs.355 Moreover, the court recognized that the prospect
344. Id. at 157.
345. 601 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
346. 876 S.W.2d at 157.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 157.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
352. Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157.
353. Id. at 158.
354. Id.
355. Id. This poignant statement rings even truer in this case than most, since the ques-
tion submitted to the jury was actually composed by the trial court. The Spencers submit-
ted several questions at the charge conference tracking the language of article 21.21, the
DTPA, and the Board Orders. The court, after considering all the questions, came back
with one liability question, feeling that it would submit the essence of the Spencers' case.
Imagine the surprise of the Spencers when that same judge granted a judgment n.o.v. say-




of a new trial is usually a disincentive, rather than an incentive, to request
submission of improper jury questions.356
In Hart v. Berko, Inc. 357 the trial court submitted Hart's liability to the
jury in a broad form submission. The jury was asked whether Hart en-
gaged in any of the following conduct:
a. Making or causing to be made any statement misrepresenting the
terms, benefits, or advantages of an insurance policy; or
b. Making, or directly or indirectly causing to be made, any asser-
tion, representation, or statement with respect to insurance that
was untrue, deceptive or misleading; or
c. Representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, reme-
dies, or obligations which it does not have or involve; or
d. Engaging in any false, misleading or deceptive act or practice.358
Because the court determined that unlisted practices under DTPA sec-
tion 17.46(a) were no longer actionable after Watson, it held that the trial
court erred in submitting subsection d. 359 Hart complained that an im-
proper judgment was rendered because the jury, which was not required
to provide an answer as to each subsection, could have based its affirma-
tive finding on subsection d. However, because there was evidence to
support an affirmative finding on the other subsections, the court con-
cluded that the inclusion of subsection d did not cause the rendition of an
improper judgment. 36°
C. ACTIONABLE CONDUCT
The issue in Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. McDanieP61 revolved
around the types of representations made by title insurers that are subject
to liability under the DTPA. At the time McDaniel purchased a house
from Couch Mortgage Company, he also purchased a title insurance pol-
icy to be issued by Chicago Title. The policy provided that Chicago Title,
"for value does hereby guarantee to the Insured ... that as of the date
hereof, the Insured has good and indefeasible title to the estate or inter-
est in the land described or referred to in this policy." 362
About five years later, McDaniel received a notice from the bank-
ruptcy trustee of Couch Mortgage that the property was subject to a pre-
existing lien that had been properly filed and recorded. McDaniel
356. Id
357. 882 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
358. 1d at 508 n.2. The language found in subsection a of the jury instruction is taken
from section 4(1) of article 21.21. See 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES PJC 102.16 (1990). The language in subsection b is taken from section 4(2) of
article 21.21. See 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.17
(1990). Subsection c of the jury instruction can be found in DTPA § 17.46(b)(12). The
language in subsection d, along with a definition of "false, misleading or deceptive," which
was provided to the jury, submits an unlisted practice under DTPA § 17.46(a). See 4 STATE
BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.15 (1990).
359. Hart, 881 S.W.2d at 508-09.
360. Id. at 511.




abandoned the property about a year later. Three months later, a federal
bankruptcy court ruled that McDaniel's purchase money lien on the
property was superior to the preexisting lien.
McDaniel brought this suit seeking damages under the DTPA based on
Chicago Title's representations. After suit was filed, Chicago Title se-
cured the release of the preexisting lien. Thus, Chicago Title argued that
it discharged its obligations under the title insurance policy and could not
be liable under the DTPA because it made no representations regarding
the status of the title to McDaniel's property. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Chicago Title, which was reversed by the
court of appeals. 363 The supreme court concluded "that there was no
genuine issue of fact concerning any misrepresentations by [Chicago Ti-
tle]" and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. 364
According to the court, a title policy is a contract of indemnity and a
title insurer only has the duty to indemnify the insured against losses
caused by defects in title.365 Thus, Chicago Title's issuance of a policy did
not constitute a representation regarding the status of the property's title.
Rather, it constituted an agreement to indemnify McDaniel against losses
caused by any defects in the title. The court, while recognizing that a title
insurer may be held liable under the DTPA for an affirmative representa-
tion, could find no allegation of any such representation, nor was there
any allegation that Chicago Title breached its duty under the contract.
366
Thus, the court could find no genuine issue of material fact regarding
representations made in the title insurance policy.
367
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, in two cases decided on the same
day, relied upon McDaniel to deny recovery against a title insurer under
the DTPA. The first case is Commonwealth Land Title Co. of Houston,
Inc. v. Nelson.368 Nelson sold some property to Graphic Investments for
$250,000-$100,000 in cash and the remaining $150,000 in a note. The
note was to be secured by a first lien in favor of Nelson. However, imme-
diately after the closing, Graphic resold the property to Allied and, be-
cause of a forged subordination agreement, First Bank, Allied's lender,
believed it obtained a first lien on the property. First Bank later fore-
closed on the property after Allied defaulted on its note. The FDIC
eventually took over First Bank and sold the property to Bonner.
After all this came to Nelson's attention, he sent Commonwealth a de-
mand letter, to which it responded by saying that because the subordina-
tion agreement was forged, the Nelsons had a superior lien to First Bank.
Thus, according to Commonwealth, the sale from the FDIC to Bonner
was ineffective to disturb the Nelsons' lien. Consequently, Common-
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 311.
366. McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d at 311.
367. Id. at 310.
368. 889 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
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wealth told the Nelsons that they had suffered no damage and could seek
foreclosure.
The Nelsons did not attempt to foreclose on the property. Instead,
they filed suit against Commonwealth Title, Commonwealth Insurance,
and others alleging, among other things, negligence, fraud, violations of
the DTPA and Insurance Code, and breach of contract. At judgment, the
trial court ruled that the Nelsons had a good and valid first lien on the
property and awarded them actual damages, additional damages under
the DTPA, attorney's fees, and exemplary damages. The court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Commonwealth.
The court first concluded that the trial court was correct in its decision
that Nelson had a first lien on the property.369 Consequently, relying on
McDaniel, the court concluded that the Nelsons could not recover any
damages from Commonwealth. 370 The court of appeals found the Nel-
sons' situation identical to that of the McDaniels. 371 Because the Nelsons
had a valid first lien, there was no title defect that required Common-
wealth to indemnify the Nelsons.372
The second case decided by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals is Tri-
Legends Corp. v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. 373 Tri-Legends alleged that
Ticor misrepresented the status of the title of property it purchased from
Allied Bank. Ticor's title commitment stated that record title appeared
to be vested in Allied Bank, when in fact it was in the Russell King De-
velopment Corporation. The trial court granted a summary judgment in
favor of Ticor and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court held that even if there was a title defect, Tri-Legends could
not recover any damages from Ticor because Ticor's only duty to Tri-
Legends was to indemnify it against losses caused by defects in the ti-
tle.374 The court reached its conclusion based on the holding in McDaniel
that a title insurance policy is a contract of indemnity and the issuance of
such a policy does not constitute a representation regarding the status of
the property's title.375
The court noted that Tri-Legends was not suing under a title insurance
policy, but because of an alleged misrepresentation made in a title com-
mitment.376 However, it did not find this of significance so as to fall
outside McDaniel.3 77 The court reasoned that a title commitment is
"nothing more than a document used by a title insurance company as a
precursor to the issuance of the title insurance policy itself. '378 Because
Ticor indemnified Tri-Legends by successfully defending its title, the
369. Id at 323.
370. Id.
371. Id at 324.
372. Id.
373. 889 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
374. Id at 443.
375. Id
376. Id.




court held that Ticor had fulfilled its duty under the title insurance pol-
icy. 379 Tri-Legends argued that this case was similar to First Title Co. of
Waco v. Garrett380 rather than McDaniel. In Garrett, the title insurance
company was held liable under the DTPA for misrepresentations made in
a title commitment.381 The court distinguished Garrett, saying that liabil-
ity there was based on an "affirmative" representation in the title com-
mitment that there were no restrictive covenants of record. 382 The court
held that the statement that record title appeared to be vested in Allied
was not an actionable affirmative representation. 383
One of the issues in Celestino v. Mid-American Indemnity Insurance
Co.,34 was when can a provision in an insurance policy be an actionable
misrepresentation. Arturo Celestino was killed while working at Sebas-
tian Cotton & Grain (Sebastian). Celestino's family sued Sebastian for
exemplary damages alleging gross negligence, their only extrastatutory
recourse under the Workers' Compensation law. About two months
before Celestino's death Sebastian purchased an umbrella policy that
provided $1 million in excess employer's liability coverage from Mid-
American. Sebastian had primary coverage through Houston General.
Therefore, when it was sued by Celestino, Sebastian made claims on
Houston General and Mid-American to settle the lawsuit for $1,950,000.
Houston General tendered its policy limits of $1 million, but Mid-Ameri-
can denied coverage claiming that its policy "[did] not cover punitive or
exemplary damages, which are the only damages alleged against the in-
sured or even that can be alleged. '385
Sebastian then settled with Celestino for $8,000,000 plus a conditional
assignment of Sebastian's claims against Mid-American. Sebastian and
Celestino later filed this lawsuit asserting causes of action for breach of
contract, unconscionable conduct, misrepresentations under the DTPA
and Insurance Code, fraud, and negligence based on Mid-American sell-
ing a policy of excess employer's liability and accepting premiums, but
providing absolutely no coverage. The policy excluded coverage for ex-
emplary damages-the only type of damages a Sebastian employee could
seek because workers' compensation coverage was also provided.
The trial court granted Mid-American's motion for summary judgment
on all causes of action.386 The court of appeals reversed as to the breach
of contract and unconscionable conduct actions, but affirmed as to the
remaining claims.387
379. Id
380. 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1993).
381. Id. at 75.
382. Tri-Legends, 889 S.W.2d at 444.
383. Id
384. 883 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ requested).
385. Id. at 312.




The common law fraud and DTPA misrepresentation causes of action
were based on allegations that Mid-American made a material misrepre-
sentation in the declaration page of the policy that said the policy con-
ferred $1 million in excess employer's liability coverage. In order to
determine whether this statement was actionable as a misrepresentation,
the court held that it must be read in the context of the whole policy.388
A general provision within a contract, held the court, cannot be isolated
and labeled a misrepresentation because subsequent provisions preclude
the effect of the general provision.389 The court emphasized that a provi-
sion in an insurance policy could be an actionable misrepresentation if it
was the sole representation made to the insured.39°
Here, however, the declaration page on which the general coverage
provision was found, warned the reader to review the entire policy care-
fully because it was a nonstandard policy and might differ from over poli-
cies. Additionally, the general provisions on the first page of a four-page
policy contained clearly worded limitations of coverage. Thus, the court
held the general provision of coverage did not amount to an actionable
material misrepresentation. 391
Celestino also asserted a DTPA unconscionable conduct cause of ac-
tion, which was also dismissed by summary judgment. The court, even
though it affirmed the summary judgment on the causes of action based
on alleged misrepresentations, reversed it as to unconscionable conduct
because the unconscionability claim was not based on alleged misrepre-
sentations but on the gross disparity between the coverage provided by
the policy (none) and the premiums paid by Sebastian.392 According to
the court, any remedy Celestino may have had "must emanate from the
discrepancy between the lack of coverage and the promise of insurance
for which Mid-American accepted premiums.
393
An agent's alleged misrepresentation was the subject of Hart v. Berko,
Inc.394 When Berko's vice-president, Blaugrund, inquired about increas-
ing the amount of Berko's coverage with its fire insurance carrier, D.J.
Enterprises, Hart, a D.J. Enterprises employee, allegedly told Blaugrund
that the coverage would increase from $242,000 to $600,000. After
Berko's building was destroyed on February 27th, Hart notified
Blaugrund that it was only covered for $242,000.
D.J. Enterprises argued that Berko had not provided enough evidence
to factually and legally support a finding that Hart's representations were
a producing cause of damages. D.J. Enterprises contended that
Blaugrund's testimony, that even if she had known Hart had not obtained
388. Id. at 314.
389. Celestino, 883 S.W.2d at 214.
390. Id. at 315.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 314.
393. Id. at 314.
394. 881 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
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the insurance on February 21st, she would not have looked for another
carrier, established that she had not relied on the misrepresentations.
The court held, however, that reliance is not an element of proof under
the DTPA or article 21.21. 39 5 Instead, what must be shown is that the
wrongful conduct was a producing cause of damages.396 "Producing
cause," which means "an efficient, exciting or contributing cause" 397 does
not contain elements of reliance or foreseeability. 398 In the context of
misrepresentations made by Hart, the court held that producing cause
was proven by evidence that Berko believed it was covered when it was
not.399 The court held that there is no requirement to prove that Berko
would have taken other action if it had known it was not covered.4°°
D. AUTHORITY OF STATE BOARD OF INSURANCE TO MAKE RULES
PROHIBITING UNFAIR PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS OF
INSURANCE
In National Association of Independent Insurers v. Texas Department of
Insurance401 a group of insurers filed suit challenging the validity of two
rules promulgated by the State Board of Insurance. The first, Rule 1000,
prohibits "insurance companies from 'blacklisting' consumers merely be-
cause they previously had been rejected by another [insurance com-
pany]." 402 The second, Rule 1003, "prohibits insurers from refusing to
sell insurance or denying a preferred rate to a consumer because the con-
sumer owns only one automobile. '40 3 The trial court upheld both
rules.404 The court of appeals affinned. 0 5
Article 21.21, section 13 gives the Board the authority to promulgate
and enforce reasonable rules and regulations as is necessary to accom-
plish the purpose of article 21.21 The purpose of article 21.21 is "to regu-
late trade practices in the business of insurance by defining, or providing
for the determination of, all such practices in this state which constitute
unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or
practices...."40 6
The insurers argued that the Board exceeded its authority in promul-
gating these rules because article 21.21 does not give the Board authority
to define as "unfair" conduct other than that enumerated in the statute.
395. Id. at 507.
396. Id
397. Id. at 506 (citing Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975)).
398. Hart, 881 S.W.2d at 506.
399. IcL at 506.
400. IU See also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1991, no writ).
401. 888 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, writ requested).
402. Id. at 202. This rule is codified at 28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 21.1000 (West 1994).
403. NAIl, 888 S.W.2d at 202. This rule is codified at 28 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 21.1003(West 1994).
404. NAI, 888 S.W.2d at 202.
405. Id
406. TEx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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The insurers asserted that such a conclusion follows from the holding in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watson407 that section 4 of article 21.21 is an
"exclusive list of statutory unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
business of insurance. '408
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the supreme court in Wat-
son also wrote that for conduct to be actionable under article 21.21 it
must be declared unfair or deceptive in section 4 or "the rules and regula-
tions of the State Board of Insurance adopted under art. 21.21 ...
The court of appeals concluded that, by this statement, the supreme court
impliedly recognized the Board's power to determine and prohibit unfair
practices. 410
Moreover, held the court, the same power is acknowledged by section
16 of article 21.21, which gives a private cause of action based on conduct
"declared . . . in rules and regulations lawfully adopted by the Board
under this article to be unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts .... "411
Even assuming the Board has the authority to define which conduct is
unfair, the insurers argued that Rules 1000 and 1003 exceeded its author-
ity because the Board did not adopt any rules or criteria by which it de-
termines whether an act is unfair. The court held that section 13(f) of
article 21.21 "provides the standards and criteria with which the Board
must comply [when promulgating rules]," and that the Board need not
promulgate additional standards before issuing rules under article
21.21.412
The insurers responded that, because the Board is not required to de-
velop standards or criteria for determining when a practice is unfair, arti-
cle 21.21 is unconstitutionally vague. According to the court, the
Legislature can delegate rule-making authority to an agency if this grant
of authority is in a statute that declares the public policy of the state and
the primary standards the agency must observe. 413 The court noted that
the supreme court has held that the phrase "not worthy of public confi-
dence" is a sufficient standard414 and that the Legislature acted within
constitutional constraints when it delegated authority to prohibit insur-
ance policy forms that are "unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading, [or]
deceptive. '415 Based on these two cases, the court held that the standard
of "unfairness" utilized by article 21.21 is constitutionally sufficient to
guide the Board in the exercise of its authority.416
407. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994).
408. Id. at 147.
409. NAIl, 888 S.W.2d at 203 (quoting Watson, 876 S.W.2d at 147).
410. Id.
411. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
412. NAIl, 888 S.W.2d at 204.
413. Id
414. Id. (citing Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 334 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1960)).
415. Id at 205 (citing Key Western Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Ins., 350 S.W.2d 839,
848-50 (Tex. 1961) (emphasis added by the court of appeals)).
416. NAIl, 888 S.W.2d at 205.
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The insurers also argued that Rules 1000 and 1003 are invalid because
they are "unnecessary, unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious"-the cir-
cumstances under which a rule can be invalidated as provided in article
21.21, section 13(f). 417 First, the insurers argued that "the Board failed to
produce any evidence of the blacklisting that Rule 1000 prohibits," or
how "the practice of refusing to issue preferred rates to single-car own-
ers" injured consumers. 418 Initially, the court held that it was the Insurers
burden to prove that the rules were invalid because there was a presump-
tion of validity. 419 The court found that the Insurers had not met their
burden.420
Moreover, the court held that the Board does not need to wait until
consumers have been harmed before promulgating a rule that prohibits
unfair practices in the business of insurance.421 Thus, the Board can take
prophylactic measures to prevent such practices.422
The insurers also argued that during the process of promulgating Rules
1000 and 1003, the Board did not comply with various provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), thus making the rules invalid.
First, asserted the insurers, the Board did not give adequate notice of the
proposed rules. The APA requires an agency to publish notice of a pro-
posed rule and to include within the notice "a concise explanation of the
particular statutory or other provisions under which the rule is pro-
posed .... -"423 The insurers contended that the notice pertaining to Rule
1000 was invalid because it contained eleven in applicable statutes that
the Board claimed authorized the rule. The court found irrelevant the
inclusion of these statutes because the notice did indicate that the rule
was being promulgated under article 21.21. The court held that the notice
was sufficient to put the public on notice of the statutory basis for the
rule.424
The APA also requires that an agency order adopting a rule include the
factual bases for the rule's adoption, a summary of comments from inter-
ested parties, and the reasons why the agency disagrees with those com-
ments. The insurers complained that the Board's order relating to Rule
1000 did not meet those requirements because it provided no factual basis
for the rule and did not explain why the prohibited activities are unfair.
The court disagreed because the order states that declining to write insur-
ance based on the actions of another insurer "is anti-competitive and re-





421. NAIl, 888 S.W.2d at 205.
422. Id.
423. TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.124(3)(A) (Vernon Pamph. 1994).
424. NAIl, 888 S.W.2d at 208-09.
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This section will ensure that the possibility of unfair competition and un-
fair practices do not occur in the marketplace. '425
IV. LIABILITY OF INSURERS FOR AGENT
MISREPRESENTATIONS
One of the most horrendous opinions of 1993, in terms of deviating
from long-established Texas law as well as the law of every other state,
was recanted when, in 1994, the supreme court issued a new opinion in
Celtic Life Insurance Co. v. Coats.426 The issue before the court was
when will an insurer be held vicariously liable for the misrepresentations
of its agent. Harrell, appointed by Celtic to be its agent for selling insur-
ance in Texas, told Coats that the Celtic policy provided a $1,000,000 limit
on benefits for in-hospital psychiatric care while only providing a $10,000
limit for out-patient psychiatric care benefits. The jury found that Harrell
misrepresented the benefits of the policy and that such representation
was a producing cause of damages to Coats. Because the jury also found
that Harrell had authority to explain, on Celtic's behalf, the trial court
rendered judgment against Celtic for Harrell's misrepresentation. The
court of appeals affirmed.427
Originally, the supreme court, led by Justice Enoch, reversed the judg-
ment, holding that before an insurer can be vicariously liable for its
agent's misrepresentations, it must have authorized the agent's authority
to make representations "outside the scope of the written document. '428
Justice Spector, heading up a three member dissent, claimed that by its
holding, the court was requiring an insurer to authorize the agent to make
misrepresentations before it could be held vicariously liable for its agent's
conduct. Justice Spector claimed that the proper holding should be that
an insurer will be liable for the acts of its agent done in the scope of his
authority, even though the insurer has not authorized the specific act.
Fortunately, on hearing, the court rejected Justice Enoch's views and
opted to return to the long-established law.
Celtic first argued to the court that it should not be liable for Harrell's
representations because he was a soliciting agent not a recording agent.
The court rejected this argument because the Insurance Code does not
make a distinction between the two types of agents in the context of life,
health, and accident insurance.429 Accordingly, the court looked to arti-
cle 21.02, which defines who are agents.430 This statute provides in part:
Any person who solicits insurance on behalf of any insurance com-
pany, .... or who takes or transmits other than for himself any appli-
cation for insurance or any policy of insurance to or from such
425. Id. at 209.
426. 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994).
427. 831 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), aff'd, 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994).
428. See 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1259 (Sept. 10, 1993). See also Maxwell, supra note 16, at
1328-35.




company, .. . or who shall receive or deliver a policy of insurance of
any such company .... or receive, or collect, or transmit any pre-
mium of insurance .... or do or perform any other act or thing in the
making or consummating of any contract of insurance for or with any
such insurance company other than for himself .... shall be held to
be the agent of the company for which the act is done, or the risk is
taken, as far as relates to all the liabilities, duties, requirements, and
penalties set forth in this chapter.431
The court held that Harrell was clearly Celtic's agent because he per-
formed some of these acts on behalf of Celtic. 432 Chief Justice Phillips
wrote a concurring opinion addressing Celtic's argument that imposing
liability on it for Harrell's misrepresentation amounts to allowing the
agent to change the terms of the policy, an act he had no authority to do
and which is specifically prohibited by article 21.02 and article 21.04. 433
These statutory provisions state that article 21 does not authorize the
agent who solicits insurance to "alter, amend, modify, waive, or change a
term or condition of an insurance policy or application for an insurance
policy. '434 Chief Justice Phillips saw no conflict in holding Celtic liable
under article 21.21 for Harrell's misrepresentations and the language of
articles 21.02 and 21.04 because Celtic was not held contractually liable
but vicariously liable under article 21.21 and the DTPA.435
After determining that Harrell was Celtic's agent in light of article
21.02, the court looked to the rule of law that an insurance company is
generally liable for any misconduct by an agent that is within the actual or
apparent scope of the agent's authority. Reiterating what it said in Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc. ,436 the court held that it is
more fair to place the risk on the insurer, which chooses the agent, than
on the insured.437
Celtic argued that it should not be liable for Harrell's misrepresenta-
tions because the jury found that Harrell did not have authority to make
representations "outside the scope of the written document. '438 Accord-
ing to the court, this finding had no bearing on Celtic's liability because
the inquiry was not whether the principal authorized the specific wrong-
ful act, but whether the agent was acting within the scope of the agency
relationship at the time the wrongful act was committed. 439 Thus, the
court held that the jury's finding that Harrell had the authority to "ex-
plain," on behalf of Celtic, the benefits of the policy was sufficient to
render Celtic liable for Harrell's misrepresentation of the benefits."40
431. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
432. Celtic Life, 885 S.W.2d at 98.
433. Id. at 101.
434. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.02 (Vernon Supp. 1994). See also TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.04 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
435. Celtic Life, 885 S.W.2d at 98.
436. 577 S.W.2d 688, 694 (Tex. 1979).
437. Celtic Life, 885 S.W.2d at 99.
438. Id.




Unfortunately the court's opinion on rehearing in Celtic Life did not do
the insured any good in Shandee Corp. v. Kemper Group." 1 Shandee
sued Kemper and its agent, Johnston, for Johnston's misrepresentations.
Prior to expiration of a general liability policy Shandee had with Kemper,
Johnston told Shandee that it and Shandee's other policies would be re-
newed and merged into a single Texas Multiple Perils (TMP) policy. Af-
ter Johnston told Shandee that it would be covered, he issued certificates
of insurance reflecting the existence of a general liability policy with ef-
fective dates from July 20, 1986, through July 20, 1987. During the fall of
1986, Shandee experienced several losses and submitted claims to Kem-
per. Initially, Kemper paid those claims but later informed Shandee that
the general liability policy had not been renewed and demanded reim-
bursement for payment of the claims.
The jury found that Kemper and Johnston were guilty of fraud. In its
original opinion, written before the supreme court's first opinion in Celtic
Life, the court concluded that Johnston had apparent authority from
Kemper to make representations about coverage to Shandee and, there-
fore, held Kemper liable for its agent's misrepresentations. 442 This con-
clusion was based on the evidence that the policies were usually renewed
with no correspondence from Kemper.443 When Shandee received a bill-
ing statement indicating that the general liability policy was not renewed,
Shandee contacted Johnston who said not to worry because he was secur-
ing a TMP policy that would encompass general liability coverage.
Shandee had purchased insurance coverage through Johnston since 1971
and had purchased insurance coverage from Kemper since 1982. Kemper
had never notified Shandee that Johnston was not authorized to secure
insurance coverage. In fact, internal memos from Kemper regarding the
discussion about a TMP policy indicated that Kemper acknowledged
Johnston's authority to make representations to Shandee that he was se-
curing a TMP policy and not renewing the former general liability policy.
The court held in its first opinion that Johnston had the authority to
secure coverage for customers such as Shandee and to assure them that
they were covered." 4 The evidence also showed that the representations
of coverage were false and that Johnston knew, or should have known,
that they were false. Furthermore, Shandee relied on the representations
and did not secure other coverage. Instead, Shandee submitted claims,
which Kemper initially paid, indicating to Shandee that Johnston's repre-
sentations were true. Kemper's actions, tending to ratify Johnston's rep-
resentations, also kept Shandee from securing additional coverage. The
court held that there was some evidence of Johnston's apparent authority
441. 880 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
442. Nos. C14-92-00126-CV, C14-92-00480-CV, 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 2628, *9-10.
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Sept. 30, 1993), withdrawn & substituted, 1994 Tex. App.
LEXIS 610.
443. Id. at *8.
444. Id. at *9.
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to make the representations he made to Shandee. 4 5 Thus, the court held
that there was sufficient evidence to establish Kemper's vicarious liability
for Johnston's fraud." 6
On rehearing, the court did an about face. The court, relying on the
supreme court's first opinion in Celtic Life,447 held that Kemper would be
liable for Johnston's conduct only if Kemper gave Johnston the authority
to make representations outside the scope of the written policy.44 8 The
court concluded that Johnston did not have apparent authority to make
misrepresentations about coverage because there was no evidence that
Kemper knowingly and voluntarily permitted Johnston to act in an unau-
thorized manner. 4 9 Strangely enough, the supreme court, even after it
withdrew its first opinion in Celtic Life, let this erroneous opinion go un-
corrected by denying the application for writ of error.
V. DEFENSE BASED ON INSURED'S MISREPRESENTATIONS
In Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Co. ,450 the
insurer attempted to avoid liability under a life insurance policy contend-
ing that the insured made misrepresentations about his medical history in
the application. The application, however, was not attached to the policy
and thus, the Bank, acting as executor of the insured's estate, argued that
the insurer could not assert a defense made on misrepresentation in the
application. The Texas Supreme Court agreed, holding that under the
pre-1989 version of article 21.35 of the Texas Insurance Code, representa-
tions made in an application for life insurance not attached to the policy
cannot be the basis of a misrepresentation defense.451
Article 21.35 now provides that "every contract or policy of life insur-
ance ... shall be accompanied by a... copy of the application .... 452
However, prior to 1989, article 21.35 did not contain the word "life." Be-
cause of a perceived conflict between the statutory provisions giving life
insurers the option of attaching the application to the policy 453 and the
statute providing that the application is a part of the policy and there of
the insurance contract, 454 several courts throughout the years have held
that article 21.35, before it mentioned life insurance, did not apply to life
insurance policies. Thus, according to these decisions, the application did
not have to be attached to the policy before the insurer could rely on a
misrepresentation therein as a defense. 455
445. Id.
446. Id
447. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1259 (Sept. 10, 1993).
448. Shandee Corp., 880 S.W.2d at 412.
449. Id. at 413.
450. 881 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1994).
451. lad at 288.
452. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.35 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
453. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.24 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
454. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.44(3) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
455. See First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Pedigo, 50 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1932, holding approved); Wise v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.1990).
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The supreme court overruled First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Pedigo456 and disapproved of Wise v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.457 by deciding
that prior to the 1989 amendment, article 21.35 applied to life insurance
policies and, therefore, representations in an application not attached to
the policy cannot be the basis of a misrepresentation defense. 458 The
court rejected the notion that articles 21.24 and 3.44(3) were in conflict,
but held, even if there were a conflict, article 21.35 still applies to life
insurance policies. 459
In Union Bankers Insurance Co. v. Shelton460 the issue was whether an
insurer must prove that the insured made misrepresentations on an appli-
cation for health insurance with the intent to deceive the insurer before
the insurer can void the policy within the first two years of its issuance. In
this case, the jury failed to find that Shelton intended to deceive Union
Bankers by misrepresenting his health history.461 Union Bankers argued
that this was irrelevant to its defense because article 3.70-3(A)(2)(a) 462
implies that an insurer may cancel a health insurance policy within two
years of its issuance if the insured makes even an innocent misrepresenta-
tion in the application4 63
In considering this issue, the court first looked to the history of section
3(A)(2)(a) of the Uniform Individual Accident & Sickness Policy Provi-
sion Law promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC), from which article 3.70-3(A)(2)(a) was derived.
According to the court, the NAIC intended this language to allow insur-
ance policies to be canceled after two years based on fraudulent misrep-
resentations when traditionally policies were not contestable after two
years for any reason.464 Section 3(A)(2)(a) did not address contesting a
policy within two years of issuance.
The court then looked to the language of article 3.70-3(A)(2)(a) itself,
which says that it does not affect the requirements for contesting policies
within the first two years. Thus, the court held that article 3.70-
3(A)(2)(a) does not provide any assistance in determining the require-
ments for contesting a policy within two years of its issuance.465
The court then referred to article 21.16, which requires a material mis-
representation before an insurance policy can be canceled. The court also
looked to the common law requiring proof of the insured's intent to
deceive before the insurer can cancel a policy. In light of the statutory
and common law, the court determined that an insurer can cancel a
health insurance policy within two years of its issuance only if the insured
456. 50 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex. Comm'n, App. 1932, holding approved).
457. 894 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1990).
458. Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 288.
459. Id.
460. 889 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1994).
461. Id. at 279.
462. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70-3(A)(2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
463. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d at 280.




makes a misrepresentation on the application with intent to deceive the
insurer.46 Because the jury failed to find that Shelton intended to
deceive Union Bankers, the court held that Union Bankers, as a matter
of law, breached the insurance policy by improperly canceling it based on
an innocent misrepresentation. 467
VI. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A. SETTLEMENT WITHOUT CONSENT
In Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds,468 the Texas Supreme Court held
that an insurer must prove that it was prejudiced by an insured's settle-
ment before it can avoid coverage under an uninsured/underinsured mo-
torist policy that contains a settlement-without-consent clause. 469
In 1987, Elizabeth Hernandez died in a car accident. She had uninsured
motorist insurance coverage through her parents' policy from Gulf Group
Lloyds in the amount of $100,000. Hernandez's parents settled all of her
claims against the driver of the car for the $25,000 policy limit of his in-
surance. Gulf Group refused to pay any amount of underinsured motor-
ist coverage, because the Hernandezes had not obtained Gulf Group's
consent to settle.
After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for $100,000, plus
costs, interest, and attorney's fees. 470 The trial court concluded that Gulf
Group was not prejudiced due by the Hernandezs' failure to comply with
the settlement-without-consent exclusion, and that application of the ex-
clusion would deprive the Hernandezes of protection required by the
Texas Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist statute.471
The court of appeals, relying on Guaranty County Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Kline,472 held that the settlement without the insured's consent
barred the Hernandezes from recovering under their own policy. 473
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of the Her-
nandezes and rendered a take-nothing judgment.474 The supreme court
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial
court's judgment in favor of the Hernandezes. 475
The supreme court noted that insurance policies, like other contracts,
are subject to the rule "that when one party to a contract commits a mate-
rial breach of that contract, the other party is excused from any obliga-
tions to perform. '476 Likewise, if the breach is not material, the
466. Id. at 282.
467. Id. at 282-83.
468. 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994).
469. Id. at 691, 694.
470. Id. at 692.
471. Id. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
472. 845 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1992).
473. Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 692.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 694.
476. Id. at 692.
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nonbreaching party is not excused from performing under the contract.477
Whether a breach is material is determined by considering the extent to
which the nonbreaching party will be deprived of a benefit that it could
have reasonably anticipated from full performance.4 78
According to the court, "in the context of an underinsured motorist
claim.... an insured's settlement without the insurer's consent [may pre-
vent] the insurer from receiving the benefit" of a subrogation right
against the wrongdoer.479 However, if the subrogation right has no value,
then the insurer will not be deprived of the contract's expected benefit.480
In such a situation, the insured's breach of the settlement-without-con-
sent clause is not material. The court, therefore, held that an insurer who
was not prejudiced by an insured's settlement may not deny coverage
under an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy that contains a settle-
ment-without-consent clause. 481 Because there was no evidence that
Gulf was prejudiced by the settlement, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals and affirmed the trial court.482
B. ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
In Texas Farmers Insurance Co. v. Gerdes,483 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals upheld a clause in an automobile policy prohibiting assignment
of insurance without insurer's consent.484 Gerdes was injured while rid-
ing as a passenger in a vehicle driven by Saldano. The automobile was
insured by Texas Farmers. The insurance policy covered any passenger
injured while occupying a covered automobile. The policy also provided
that the insured could not assign her rights under the policy without the
insurer's written consent.
Gerdes began a series of treatments for her injuries at Griffin Chiro-
practic Clinic and assigned her rights to the clinic without the written
consent of Texas Farmers. Thereafter, Texas Farmers paid Gerdes $1003
for the treatments. Gerdes never paid Griffin Chiropractic. Griffin Chi-
ropractic sued Texas Farmers for payment based on the assignment of
rights executed by Gerdes. Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment in Griffin Chiropractic's
favor.485
According to the court of appeals, the summary judgment was proper
only if a valid assignment existed. 486 In considering this issue, the court
of appeals noted that an insurance contract "is subject to the same rules
477. See id at 694.
478. Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 692-93.
479. Id. at 693.
480. Id
481. Id. at 693.
482. Id.
483. 880 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
484. Id. at 216.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 217.
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of construction as other contracts. ''487 When it is not ambiguous, a court
will interpret the contract as a matter of law.4a8 The court held that the
non-assignment clause was unambiguous.489 It also held that non-assign-
ment clauses have been consistently enforced by Texas courts, and that
the prohibition against the assignment of rights by a named insured to an
insurance contract has been previously upheld by the court.490
Griffin Chiropractic conceded that the clause barred assignment by the
named insured, but contended that the clause did not apply to Gerdes as
a third-party beneficiary. However, according to the court, "[a] third-
party beneficiary 'steps into the shoes' of the named insured and is bound
by the policy's terms."491 Thus, a beneficiary does not have greater rights
and cannot acquire a better standing to enforce a contract than the con-
tracting party.492
C. INDIRECr CONTACr RULE
In Collier v. Employers National Insurance Co. ,493 Collier sued Em-
ployers National Insurance Company seeking compensation under the
uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile policy for gunshot inju-
ries he received from a passing vehicle. While Collier was driving a
friend's car in Houston, an unidentified vehicle pulled alongside him and
fired two shots. Collier sustained injuries from the shooting and sought
payment under the uninsured motorist coverage of his friend's auto insur-
ance policy. Employers was granted summary judgment by the trial
court. 494 The court of appeals affirmed. 495
The court first held that Collier's injuries did not "arise out of the own-
ership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle as required by
the policy. '496 The court held that "use" means "use of the automobile,
as an automobile. '497 The court refused to broadly define "use" as any
act which occurs in, on, or around the vehicle. 498 The court stated that its
narrow definition was harmonious with the other provisions of the insur-
ance policy which, taken together, revealed the parties' intent to insure
only against automobile collisions.499
The court next looked to Appleman's treatise on insurance law as sup-
port for its conclusion. Appleman provides a three-part test for constru-
ing the "use" requirement of uninsured motorist coverage, as follows:
487. Id.
488. Texas Farmers, 880 S.W.2d at 217.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 218.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 219.
493. 861 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
494. Id at 287.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 288.
497. Id.
498. Collier, 861 S.W.2d at 288-89.
499. I& at 288.
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1. The accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the
automobile, as such;
2. The accident must have arisen within the natural territorial limits
of [the] automobile, and the actual use, loading, or unloading
must not have terminated; and
3. The automobile must not merely contribute to the cause of the
condition which produces the injury, but must itself produce the
injury.50°
The court reasoned that the attack on Collier "did not arise out of the
inherent nature of the automobile" because the same type of injury was
possible in circumstances not involving an automobile as the site of the
shooting.501 The court stated that "[tihe shotgun, not the automobile,
was the instrument that caused Collier's injury."'50 2 Thus, according to
the court, "the term arising out of the use of the uninsured motor vehicle
[did] not encompass drive by shootings and shootings from moving
vehicles.150 3
The court next concluded that there was no coverage under the policy
because there was no actual physical contact with an uninsured vehicle. 5 4
The policy defined "uninsured motor vehicle" as: "a land motor vehicle
... [w]hich is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be
identified and which hits: (a) you or any family member; (b) a vehicle
which you or any family member are occupying; or (c) your covered
auto. 50 5
According to the court, the Insurance Code requires that in order to
recover under the uninsured motorist coverage, "actual physical contact
must have occurred between the motor vehicle owned or operated by
such unknown person and the person or property of the insured." 50 6 The
court reasoned that Collier failed to show that his injury resulted from
actual, direct physical contact with the uninsured vehicle. 507
The court further held that the shotgun blast did not meet the "indirect
contact rule. '508 The court acknowledged that the indirect contact rule
allows recovery under a policy's uninsured motorist provisions when an
uninsured vehicle collides with a third-party vehicle and propels it into
the insured vehicle. 509 However, the court stated that "[t]he rule is inap-
plicable when the unidentified vehicle does not hit any car."' 510 Absent
500. Id at 289 (quoting 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 4317
(Buckley ed.)(1979)).
501. Id. at 289.
502. Id.
503. Collier, 861 S.W.2d at 289.
504. Id.
505. Id (emphasis added by the court).
506. Id (quoting TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.06-1(2)(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
507. Id. at 290.
508. Collier, 861 S.W.2d at 290.
509. Id.
510. Id. (citing Guzman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 802 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991,




any physical contact by the uninsured vehicle, the court concluded that
the indirect contact rule did not apply.51'
D. OWNED-BUT-UNSCHEDULED-VEHICLE EXCLUSION
In American Economy Insurance Co. v. Tomlinson,512 Tomlinson was
injured in an automobile accident while she was driving a Mercedes Benz
that had belonged to her father, George Rashti. Rashti had died approxi-
mately two years earlier. Under Rashti's will, Tomlinson and her sister
each inherited an undivided one-half interest in their father's estate, in-
cluding the Mercedes. Rashti's will had been admitted to probate, but
the administration of the estate had not closed at the time of the accident.
The certificate of title was still in Rashti's name.
American Economy Insurance Company (AEIC) issued an automobile
policy to Tomlinson, but the Mercedes was not listed on the policy as a
covered automobile. After the accident, Tomlinson filed a claim for per-
sonal injury protection and uninsured motorist coverages under the pol-
icy. AEIC then fied this suit seeking a declaration that it was not
obligated to pay under the policy. AEIC relied on two "owned-but-un-
scheduled" vehicle exclusion clauses. These excluded coverage for per-
sonal injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage for any injury
that Tomlinson suffered while she occupied an automobile that she
owned but was not listed as a covered vehicle. The district court granted
AEIC's motion for summary judgment and entered a final judgment de-
claring that AEIC was not obligated to pay Tomlinson's claim.513 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed.5 14
The Fifth Circuit concluded that, because Tomlinson did own the car,
the owned-but-unscheduled-vehicle exclusions precluded her "from re-
covering personal injury protection and uninsured motorists coverage for
the injuries she suffered. 515 Tomlinson countered by arguing that the
exclusions were invalid because they deprived her of coverage required
by the Texas Insurance Code. The court rejected this argument, noting
that the Austin Court of Appeals had faced that very issue and concluded
that the owned-but-unscheduled-vehicle exclusions were enforceable and
did not violate the Texas Insurance Code.5 16 The court noted that there
were some earlier cases holding the exclusions invalid, but the most re-
cent cases from the courts of appeals have all found the exclusions to be
valid and enforceable.517
511. Collier, 861 S.W.2d at 290.
512. 12 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1994).
513. Id at 506.
514. Id
515. Id at 509.
516. Id (citing Conlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1992, writ denied)).
517. Tomlinson, 12 F.3d at 510.
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E. NOTICE OF SUIT
In Harwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,518 the court
was faced with the issue of whether the insurer had liability under an
automobile policy when the insured did not comply with the notice of suit
provision of the policy. Tanuny Hubbard died as a result of an automobile
accident with Leatherman. State Farm was Hubbard's insurer. Three
days shy of two years after the accident, Leatherman filed suit against
"Tammy D. Hubbard, Deceased. '519 On the same day Harwell was ap-
pointed temporary administrator of Hubbard's estate. About seven
months later Groce, the attorney representing Leatherman, sent a copy
of the petition to State Farm and asked it to file an answer within a month
to avoid a default judgment.
When State Farm had still not filed its answer after a couple of months,
Groce calls Anderson, the attorney representing State Farm. Groce in-
formed Anderson that he was going to make Harwell's temporary admin-
istration permanent, amend the pleadings, obtain service on Harwell, and
proceed to judgment. Anderson told Groce that State Farm was not go-
ing to spend any money representing Harwell or furnish her with a de-
fense because limitations had run. Groce did as he promised and
Leatherman obtained a judgment against "Tammy D. Hubbard, De-
ceased. '520 Thirty-one days later, Groce sent a copy of the judgment to
State Farm and demanded payment. State Farm refused to pay the judg-
ment and, instead, filed this declaratory judgment action. State Farm
claimed that it had no obligation under the policy because Harwell did
not promptly comply with the policy's notice provision and because the
judgment was rendered against the wrong party. The trial court granted a
summary judgment in favor of State Farm.521 The court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that "State Farm was prejudiced, as a matter of law, by
Harwell's failure to comply with the policy's notice of suit provision in the
policy .... "522
VII. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
A. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA)
1. How Far Does ERISA's Preemption Extend?
In Universe Life Insurance Co. v. Giles,523 Universe Life denied Giles'
health insurance claims for her hospitalization for cardiac problems and a
bypass operation several months later, contending that they were the re-
sult of preexisting conditions. Universe Life drew this conclusion from
the statement in the medical records of Dr. Sanford, one of Giles' physi-
518. 876 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994), aff'd, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 458 (Mar.
30, 199).
519. Id at 495.
520. Id at 496.
521. Id at 497.
522. 1d at 499-500.
523. 881 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ requested).
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cians, reflecting that she had experienced chest pain and hypertension for
two to three years. Dr. Sanford corrected his statement and informed
Universe Life that the chest pain had only been experienced for two to
three weeks, with no hypertension. Universe Life, however, continued to
deny the claim.
The jury found in favor of Giles and a judgment was rendered for
Giles. Universe Life appealed, arguing that Giles' state law claims were
preempted by ERISA. According to the court, the mere "purchase of
insurance, when the purchasing employer neither directly nor indirectly
owns, controls, administers, or assumes responsibility for the policy.., is
not covered by ERISA.'' 524 A plan is not an employee welfare benefit
plan under ERISA if:
(1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee
organization;
(2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for em-
ployees or members;
(3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization
with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program,
to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or
members, to collect premiums through payroll deductions or
dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no considera-
tion in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the pro-
gram, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit,
for administrative services actually rendered in connection with
payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.5 25
In applying this four-part analysis, the court noted that "the exclusion
of a plan from ERISA protections would occur only if all four of factors
were shown to exist. '526 Otherwise, preemption would occur.527 The evi-
dence showed: (1) that "[n]o contributions were made by [Giles'] em-
ployer;" (2) "[tlhe funds were deducted directly from her personal bank
account;" (3) "[plarticipation in the program was completely voluntary;"
and (4) "the employer was in no way responsible for administering, con-
trolling, or assuming responsibility for either the policy or its benefits. 528
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court was correct not
to apply ERISA.529
2. How an ERISA Plan is Established
The court of appeals in Dallas held in Waddell v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of Texas,530 that an ERISA plan is established "[i]f from the
surrounding circumstances a reasonable person can ascertain the in-
524. Id. at 50.
525. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-10) (1987).
526. Universe Life, 881 S.W.2d at 51.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 51.
529. Id.
530. 877 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
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tended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and pro-
cedures for receiving benefits."'5 31
Waddell was an employee of J.C. Penney and a member of the Kaiser
HMO plan, the provider of medical and dental benefits to employees and
dependents. Heather, Waddell's daughter, was admitted to the hospital
for psychiatric care and remained there for nine days. At that time, her
primary care physician was informed that Heather no longer met Kaiser's
eligibility for psychiatric care coverage. After her release from the hospi-
tal, Kaiser continued to pay for Heather's out-patient psychiatric care.
Waddell filed suit after Kaiser refused to provide in-patient psychiatric
care for Heather. Waddell asserted various causes of action, including
breach of contract, negligence, gross negligence, violations of the Insur-
ance Code, violations of the DTPA, breach of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. She also sought a declaratory judgment. Kaiser moved for sum-
mary judgment under the preemptive provisions of ERISA.
"Kaiser asserted that it was an 'employee welfare benefit plan' entitled
to the protections of ERISA," and that federal law preempted Waddell's
state law claims.532 The trial court dismissed the majority of Waddel's
claims on Kaiser's first motion for summary judgment, although it al-
lowed the breach of contract claim and declaratory judgment action to
stand as possible civil actions under the ERISA civil enforcement provi-
sions.5 33 Kaiser then filed a motion for complete summary judgment, as-
serting that Waddell did not pray for damages recoverable under ERISA.
The motion was granted by the trial court.53
Waddell argued that Kaiser failed to establish itself as an "employee
welfare benefit plan" "entitled to protection under ERISA because: (1)
Kaiser did not comply with the claims procedure prescribed by ERISA;
(2) [the] doctors were not 'fiduciaries' under the HMO plan; and (3) Kai-
ser was not listed as the 'Plan administrator.' ,,535 The court determined
that an ERISA plan must meet the statutory definition in 29 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1002(1) and is established "if from the surrounding circumstances a
reasonable person can ascertain the intended benefits, a class of benefi-
ciaries, the source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits." 536
Because the Kaiser plan meet those criteria, the court held it was an ER-
ISA plan.537
531. Id. at 346.
532. Id at 344.
533. Id
534. Id
535. Waddell, 877 S.W.2d at 345.




3. Contract Interpretation/Standard of Review Under ERISA
In Ramsey v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America,538 Diane Ram-
sey, and her dependents, including her husband, William, were covered
under a group health insurance policy issued by Colonial to Ramsey's
employer, Moulden Supply Company. While the policy was in force, Wil-
liam Ramsey fell off a ladder and fractured his spine. This accident left
him a quadriplegic in need of medical treatment and care for the remain-
der of his life.
Some time after Colonial began paying the medical expenses incurred
by Ramsey, Moulden's premiums were dramatically escalated, causing
Moulden to cancel the policy. The Ramseys then sought to secure a con-
version policy from Colonial that would afford the same benefit level they
had been provided under the group policy. Colonial issued a conversion
policy to the Ramseys with a $20,000 maximum life-time benefit, rather
than a $2 million limit, which the group policy had provided. After the
conversion policy terminated, Colonial refused to pay any further medical
expenses and the Ramseys filed suit against Colonial in state court. Colo-
nial removed the action to federal court claiming ERISA preemption.
The district court dismissed the Ramseys' state law causes of action and
proceeded with the cause of action under ERISA to obtain benefits due
under an employee benefit plan.539 The district court held that the Ram-
seys: (1) were entitled to benefits under the original group policy until his
disability came to an end or until he obtained other insurance; (2) that
any premiums paid under the conversion policy were unnecessary and
should be refunded; and (3) that there should be no award of attorney's
fees under ERISA.540 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
5 41
Colonial argued that the district court misinterpreted the insurance
policy and that it had no obligation to pay benefits upon termination of
the policy. Before considering this argument, the court first had to deter-
mine the standard of reviewY42 Relying on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch,54 3 the Fifth Circuit held that a denial of benefits under ERISA
is to be reviewed under de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the
administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits
or to construe the terms of the plan. 544 Because there was no allegation
that Colonial exercised its discretionary authority in denying the Ram-
seys' benefits, the court held that there should be a de novo review of
Colonial's decision to terminate Ramsey's coverage.545
538. 12 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994).
539. Id. at 473.
540. It at 473-74.
541. Id. at 474.
542. Id. at 478.
543. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).




The provision of the policy that governed whether Colonial was re-
quired to extend coverage to the Ramseys was entitled "Extension of
Medical Benefits" and read:
If you or a dependent are totally disabled when premium payments
stop, medical benefits will be continued, until the earlier of:
a. 12 months from the day you become disabled;
b. the date total and continuous disability ends;
c. you or the dependent are insured for similar medical benefits
under another group plan. The plan must pay benefits for the
injury or sickness that caused the total disability.546
Colonial argued that it was not required to extend benefits to the Ram-
seys because premium payments had stopped more than twelve months
from the day he became disabled. The court held, however, that the lan-
guage in subsection (a) was "inapplicable to Ramsey by its very terms
and, therefore, [Colonial was required] to offer an extension of [the] in-
surance benefits under the old policy. '547
The court reasoned that the insurance policy made a consistent differ-
entiation between the terms "you" and "your dependents. ' 548 Thus, be-
cause it did not make reference to dependents, subsection (a) only
applied to the insured.549 By contrast, subsection (c) stated that benefits
would continue until "you or the dependent are insured for similar medi-
cal benefits under another group plan." 550 The court held that, had Colo-
nial intended subsection (a) to cover Ramsey, it should have written it in
a similar fashion as to subsection (c) to include the term "your
dependents."5 51
The court further determined that, even if the policy were not entirely
consistent in distinguishing between the employee and dependents, the
section on extension of medical benefits was ambiguous.5 52 Therefore,
the court held that the contra drafter rule on contract interpretation re-
quires the policy to be construed in favor of the insured and against the
insurer.55
3
Because the Fifth Circuit determined that Colonial was required to ex-
tend benefits to Ramsey under the original group policy, it concluded that
there was no reason for the Ramseys to have purchased a conversion
policy.554 Thus, the district court was correct in rendering judgment that
Colonial refund the premiums paid for the conversion policy.555
546. Id. at 475.
547. Id. at 478.
548. Id
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